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I.  ABSTRACT 
Article 11 of the European Economic Area (“EEA”) and Article 34 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) prohibit 
quantitative restrictions on the free movement of goods.  The EEA is 
monitored by the European Free Trade Area Court (“EFTA Court”) and 
the TFEU is monitored by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”). In 
theory, the EFTA Court and the ECJ should interpret Article 11 and 
Article 34 in the same manner in order to promote harmonization of the 
law on the free movement of goods and allow for further economic 
integration between EFTA and the EU.  However, as this work reveals, 
there are some significant differences in the jurisprudence on the free 
movement of goods between the EFTA Court and the ECJ that threaten 
the legal harmony of the EEA and could potentially lead to an uncertain 
trade climate between the two trade groups. 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  The EU and EFTA 
Although the beginnings of the European Union (“EU”) can be traced 
to an earlier time, it was the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957 by six 
European countries that began the path toward economic integration in 
the form of a common market.1  The EU, formerly the European 
Economic Community (“EEC”), which currently consists of 28 member-
states, is a common market that requires that all member-states maintain 
a common import policy (i.e., customs union), in conjunction with an 
agreement for the free flow of goods, services, capital and labor.2  The 
goal behind the creation of the EU/EEC was to create a larger, politically 
unified, economic area.3 
 
 1.  W. RAYMOND DUNCAN ET AL., WORLD POLITICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 211 
(2006). 
 2.  THEODORE H. COHN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 141 
(4th ed. 2008). 
 3.  RICHARD BALDWIN & CHARLES WYPLOSZ, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 45–46 (4th ed. 2012). 
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The European Free Trade Area (“EFTA”) was founded as a “reaction” 
to the EU/EEC.4 The principal aim of the Framers of EFTA was to prevent 
the EU/EEC from becoming a powerful, protectionist customs union that 
could dominate the continent.5  EFTA, like the EU, has created much 
integration across borders by elites, business groups, and trade unions.6  
There is comment that the citizens of the member-states of EFTA preferred a 
lesser form of integration in comparison to that of the EU/EEC.7  The trade 
group was founded by way of the Stockholm Convention signed in 1960.8  
EFTA was created by a set of member-states that were not comfortable 
with the higher level of integration found in the EEC.9  In contrast to the 
EU/EEC, EFTA had no political goals and comprised a mere one 
institution.10  The EFTA member-states at the time of its formation were 
wealthy, developed, and would seemingly have no trouble making adjustments 
to integrate along the lines of a free trade arrangement.11  Given its status 
as a free trade association, and not a customs union, external trade policy 
does not have to be collectively decided.12  However, EFTA was an 
immediate boon to its smaller states while the United Kingdom alone 
provided well over 50% of the trade group’s population.13 University of 
Illinois Professor Larry Neal argues that EFTA was birthed largely due to 
the United Kingdom’s recognition that the EU member-states were 
enjoying export-led growth and it wanted to enjoy the free movement 
principles without the restrictions of the remaining parts of the agreement.14 
 
 4.  MARTIN DEDMAN, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
1945-2008: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 116 (2d ed. 2010). 
 5.  ANDREW GLENCROSS, THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: POLITICAL 
UNION OR A HOUSE DIVIDED? 48 (2014). 
 6.  WOLFRAM KAISER, Transnational Networks in European Governance: The 
Informal Politics of Integration, in THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ORIGINS OF A 
TRANS- AND SUPRANATIONAL POLITY 1950-72, at 26 (Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht & 
Morten Rasmussen eds. 2009). 
 7.  GLENCROSS, supra note 5, at 225. 
 8.  JOHN MCCORMICK & JONATHAN OLSEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICS AND 
POLICIES 64 (5th ed. 2014). 
 9.  GUY TRITTON ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 38 (3d ed. 2008). 
 10.  MCCORMICK & OLSEN, supra note 8, at 64. 
 11.  Id. at 81. 
 12.  BALDWIN & WYPLOSZ, supra note 3, at 15. 
 13.  DEDMAN, supra note 4, at 97. 
 14.  LARRY NEAL, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 275 
(2007). 
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B.  The EEA 
There is some evidence that less formal integration between the EU and 
EFTA was taking place before the EEA Agreement’s adoption.15  During 
EFTA’s infancy (1960-1966), free trade among its member-states was 
built in stages.16  At one time, EFTA had more members than did the EU/
EEC.17  However, during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, firms within the 
EFTA member-states started pushing their governments to form closer 
ties with the EU/EEC.18  There is some evidence that firms located outside 
the EU/EEC were suffering from diminished relative competitiveness due 
to the strength of the EU/EEC trade group.19 
For many of the EFTA countries, EFTA membership itself was seen as 
a mere stepping-stone to the EU/EEC.20  The push to form the European 
Economic Area (“EEA”), a free trade association comprising both EU and 
EFTA member-states, made sense in the early 1990s given that 55% of 
EFTA exports went to the EU.21  Three of the four EFTA member-states, 
including Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein (Switzerland, an EFTA 
member but not an EEA member), found the advantages of the EU 
common market too tempting and joined the EU in forming the EEA in 
1992.22  Ironically, most of the EFTA member-states had applied to 
become members of the EU by the time the EEA Agreement came into 
effect on January 1, 1995.23  Switzerland most likely rejected membership in 
the EEA because of its cultural tradition of neutrality, despite the fact that 
it sends one-third of its exports to, and receives two-thirds of its imports 
from, the EU.24  Nevertheless, the 1992 negotiations did not lead to a 
larger EU due to a lack of confidence in the political position of EFTA 
countries on the part of the EU member-states.25  In 2009, Iceland applied 
 
 15.  Kristian Steinnes, Socialist Party Networks in Northern Europe: Moving Towards 
the EEC Applications of 1967, in THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ORIGINS OF A 
TRANS- AND SUPRANATIONAL POLITY 1950-62, supra note 6, at 93 (Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte 
Leucht & Morten Rasmussen eds. 2009). 
 16.  DEDMAN, supra note 4, at 97. 
 17.  ANDREAS STAAB, THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPLAINED: INSTITUTIONS, ACTORS, 
GLOBAL IMPACT 31 (2d ed. 2011). 
 18.  BALDWIN & WYPLOSZ, supra note 3, at 25. 
 19.  Id. at 17. 
 20.  DEDMAN, supra note 4, at 118. 
 21.  MCCORMICK & OLSEN, supra note 8, at 81. 
 22.  TRITTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 39. 
 23.  TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 6 (7th ed. 
2010). 
 24.  NEAL, supra note 14, at 318. 
 25.  DEDMAN, supra note 4, at 117. 
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to become a member-state of the EU due to the instability of its financial 
system, but has recently recanted its desire to join the EU.26 
The EU is the world’s largest single market alone with an estimated 496 
million consumers, and thus, following the addition of the three EFTA 
countries, the 30 member-states of the EEA would clearly be considered 
the largest single market.27  Countries in Europe not belonging to the EEA 
will suffer as their citizens and firms will feel the effects of tariffs and 
quotas.28  Such an impact may serve as an incentive to join the EU or EFTA 
and later the EEA.29  Other applicant and candidate countries to the EU 
such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro as well 
as other possible EU-candidate countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine could further enlarge the EEA.30 
The EEA has both a general objective and an economic objective.  The 
general objective is to work toward continuous economic relations aided 
by the development of a common set of rules for trade and competition.31  
The economic objective is to extend the EU’s common market rules to the 
three EFTA member-states that are part of the EEA.32  Thus, the provisions 
that ensure non-discrimination with regard to the origin of goods traded 
from one member-state of the EEA to another member-state are of great 
importance.33 
Although the EEA can generally be considered an extension of the EU, 
the professionals working in this field should constantly review the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ and the EFTA Court to make sure that the rules 
of the common market are being interpreted harmoniously.34  The EEA’s 
enactment gave birth to the EFTA Court, a separate court from the ECJ, 
which has a mission to determine whether an EFTA member-state has 
violated its obligations under the EEA and to provide advisory opinions 
 
 26.  STAAB, supra note 17, at 41. Anna Molin, Iceland Says It Has No Plans For 
EU Membership, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2015, 6:11PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
iceland-says-it-has-no-plans-for-eu-membership-1426198286?KEYWORDS=iceland+euro 
pean+union. 
 27.  THOMAS OATLEY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 31 (5th ed. 2012). 
 28.  NEAL, supra note 14, at 43. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  RONALD H. LINDEN, ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 137–38 (Sharon L. 
Wolchik & Jane L. Curry eds. 2011). 
 31.  TRITTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 39. 
 32.  Id. at 39, 41. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  CHRISTOPHER STOTHERS, PARALLEL TRADE IN EUROPE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
COMPETITION AND REGULATORY LAW 423 (2007). 
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to national courts on the same subject.35  The EFTA Court maintains 
similar rules of procedure to those of the ECJ.36  For example, both EFTA 
Court and ECJ do not allow for dissenting opinions.37  At one time, there 
existed a proposal for an all-competent “EEA Court” but in 1991 the ECJ 
found that provision of the EEA Agreement in violation of EU law.38  The 
ECJ’s greatest concern was that the EEA Court would have sole jurisdiction 
to interpret the EEA Agreement.39  This reality leads to the possibility 
that EEA law and EU law may not be harmonized.40 
The ECJ should, with some exceptions, interpret the EEA as it would 
TFEU.41  There is really no one court that maintains the competence to 
determine the proper interpretation of the EEA Agreement.42  It is generally 
accepted that EEA law, through EFTA Court decisions, does not impact 
the case law of the ECJ.43  It is unclear, however, what impact the ECJ has 
on the case law of the EFTA Court when the ECJ interprets the EEA 
Agreement.44  When the ECJ and the EFTA Court interpretations differ, 
the EEA Joint Committee, which is entrusted to constantly monitor the 
development of case law on both sides, can take action to promote 
consistency in the EEA.45  However, the EEA Joint Committee cannot 
alter the case law of either the ECJ or the EFTA Court.46  The EFTA 
Surveillance Authority is also empowered to avoid legal imbalances 
between the EFTA and EU member-states.47  The Surveillance Authority 
operates much like the European Commission for reasons of homogeneity 
and credibility with its counterpart.48 
C.  Article 11 of the EEA and Article 34 of the TFEU 
Article 11 of the EEA is a mirror image of Article 34 (ex 28, 30) of The 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), which prohibits a member-
state of the EEA from imposing regulations that create quantitative restrictions 
 
 35.  TRITTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 45. 
 36.  NIELS FENGER ET AL., EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (EFTA) AND 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA (EEA) 115 (2012). 
 37.  Id. at 115–16. 
 38.  HARTLEY, supra note 23, at 5. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See FENGER, ET AL., supra note 36, at 59. 
 41.  See id. at 75. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 60. 
 44.  Id. at 75. 
 45.  See id. at 76. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 57. 
 48.  Id. at 58. 
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on imports or any measure that has the equivalent effect.49 Likewise, 
Article 13 of the EEA is a mirror image of Article 36 (ex 30, 36) of TFEU. 
Article 13 modifies Article 11 in that it allows for quantitative restrictions on 
grounds such as public morality or public policy, for example, but in any 
case, cannot constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination.50  In other 
words, Articles 13 and 36 serve as a set of permissible exceptions to 
the bars put forth in Articles 11 and 34 of the EEA and the Treaty, 
respectively. 
III.  PURPOSE OF THIS WORK 
The goal of this work is to determine whether the EFTA Court is 
meeting its obligations by interpreting the EEA in accordance with the 
existing jurisprudence of the ECJ with regard to quantitative restrictions 
on imports.  This work will present case law that reflects a condition of 
differing jurisprudence on the same topics. If such a condition does exist, 
the law of the EEA and the law of the EU become separated, leaving 
member-states, lawyers, government officials, and businesses to question 
the status of the law within the EEA, generally. More narrowly, these 
 
 49.  Article 10 and Article 11 of the EEA states: “Quantitative restrictions on imports 
and all measures having equivalent effect, shall be prohibited between the Contracting 
Parties”; “Without prejudice to the arrangements in Protocol 5, this shall also apply to 
customs duties of a fiscal nature.”  Article 34 (ex 28, 30) of the TFEU states: “Quantitative 
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited 
between the Member States.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union art. 34, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C83) 61 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 50.  Article 13 of the EEA states:  
The provisions of Articles 11 and 12 shall not prelude prohibitions or restrictions 
on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, 
public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, 
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic 
or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property.  
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or disguised restriction on trade between the Contracting Parties. 
Article 36 (ex 30, 36) of the TFEU reads:  
the provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions 
on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, 
public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, 
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic 
or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. 
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 
TFEU art. 36. 
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individuals and entities will be left to question the law on quantitative 
restrictions on imports, specifically, in Europe.  Another purpose of this 
work is to explore some of the arguments that a member-state might put 
forth in an attempt to maintain a quantitative restriction in an effort to 
promote its own interests. 
IV.  CASE LAW ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS FROM THE ECJ 
A.  Certificate of Authenticity 
The decision by the ECJ in Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville serves as 
one of the early, bedrock cases showing little tolerance for any attempt by 
a member-state to enact regulations that limit trade under the TFEU.51  
Although the ECJ’s opinion was short, its holding was concrete:  a 
member-state’s requirement that an importer obtain a certificate of 
authenticity before importing goods into a member-state that were 
already in free circulation in another member-state was a violation of 
Article 34’s (ex 28, 30) prohibition against quantitative restrictions on 
imported goods.52  In Dassonville, importers were criminally charged by 
the Belgian government after importing (into Belgium) Scotch whisky 
they had acquired in free circulation in France, without first obtaining a 
certificate of authenticity.53  The required certificate would have, according 
to the Belgian government, served as a source of consumer protection as 
potential buyers would know what exactly they were purchasing.54  The 
Court’s rationale in striking the Belgian rule focused on the difficulty that 
the trader would have in obtaining the certificate, which, in this case, 
would have to come from the British government.55 
B.  Pricing 
The ECJ in Criminal Proceedings Against Keck offered to support 
domestic legislation and stated that its rulings in Dassonville and Rewe-
Zentral did not apply to a French law that prohibited the resale of goods 
at a level below cost.56  In Keck, two supermarket retailers that sold both 
beer and coffee products at below cost argued that Article 34 (ex 28, 30) 
 
 51.  Case C-8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837. 
 52.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 53.  Id. ¶ 3. 
 54.  Id. ¶ 6. 
 55.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 56.  Case C-267/91 and 268/91, Criminal Proceedings Against Keck and Mithouard, 
1993 E.C.R. I-6097, 6131. 
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and Article 18 (ex 12, 6) should prohibit application of the French law.57 
They argued that the French law limited the free movement of goods by 
removing a sales strategy, thereby limiting the traders’ competitiveness, 
as traders in other member-states did not have to contend with such laws.58 
Although admitting that the French law might indirectly cause a 
reduction in cross-border trade, the ECJ upheld the law, stating that TFEU 
applies only to the movement of goods, not marketing, and the French law 
permissibly dealt only with the marketing of goods within a member-
state.59  Moreover, the ECJ did not find that the French law went as far as 
meeting Article 34’s “equivalent effect.”60  The Court felt that there was 
a need to clarify its jurisprudence since the ECJ was concerned that 
retailers and traders were relying on Article 34 too often to attack 
domestic rules that interfered with their commercial freedom.61 Thus, the 
ECJ stated that domestic rules that address selling arrangements do not 
violate Articles 34 and 18.62 
C.  Product Contents, Composition, and Licensing 
The ECJ has also held that a member-state’s requirement that imported 
alcoholic beverages have a minimum alcohol content violates Article 34.63  
In Rewe-Zentral, the ECJ entertained three arguments put forth by the 
German government as to why a 1922 statute requiring minimum alcohol 
content for imports did not violate TFEU. First, Germany argued that the 
requirement advanced public health by limiting the spread of low-level 
alcohol products, which actually tend to induce greater alcohol tolerance 
in comparison to their high-level alcohol counterparts.64  Second, the 
German government contended that its domestic rule was necessary in 
order to guard against unfair competition; because alcohol is the most 
 
 57.  Id. at I-6124. 
 58.  See id. Article 18 (ex 12, 6) of the TFEU states: “Within the scope of application 
of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. The European Parliament and 
the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt rules 
designed to prohibit such discrimination.” TFEU art. 18. 
 59.  Id. at I-6129. 
 60.  Id. at I-6131. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  See Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 3 
C.M.L.R. 494, 510 (1979). 
 64.  Id. at 509. 
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expensive ingredient in an alcoholic beverage, low-level alcohol producers 
would have a comparative advantage in the marketplace without the 
rule.65  Third, Germany argued that if member-states must allow imported 
alcoholic beverages with any alcohol content into circulation, the real 
regulation would come from the producing countries that are permitted to 
adopt domestic production rules.66  Thus, an EU-wide importation standard 
of minimum alcohol content would inevitably develop based on the 
member-state with the lowest minimum alcohol content level for purposes 
of production.67 
The ECJ dismissed Germany’s arguments, and emphasized the use and 
value of consumer protection law to combat Germany’s marketplace 
fears.68 As the ECJ stated, consumer protection law requires an indication 
of both origin and alcohol content on the exterior packaging.69  Accordingly, 
the Court held that once alcoholic beverages are legally produced and 
marketed in one of the member-states, barriers must not preclude inter-
member-state trade of those products.70  Although the ECJ did not address 
the point specifically, it should be noted that part of the plaintiff’s 
argument was that if the German law were upheld, member-states could 
decrease the likelihood through domestic regulation that traditional goods 
such as those unique to a member-state and produced in that one member-
state will cross borders.71 
The ECJ has recognized that the protection of the environment is a 
credible cause that can lead to a viable quantitative restriction on imports 
by a member-state.72  However, in Re Disposable Beer Cans, the ECJ held 
that any such restriction must strike a proportionate in a balance between 
policies encouraging free trade and a concern for environmental health.73  
Here, the ECJ struck down a Danish law requiring that importers of both 
beer and soft drink cans to package their products in a pre-approved 
reusable container, holding that it violated Article 34 (ex 28, 30).74  The 
ECJ’s rationale in this case was similar to its decision in Rewe-Zentral, as 
 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 509–10. 
 70.  Id. at 510–11. 
 71.  Id. at 496.  Additionally, it should be added that the 1922 law did not apply to 
low-alcohol beverages that were produced in Germany.  Id. at 494. 
 72.  See generally Case C-240/83, Ass’n de Defense des Bruleurs D’Huiles Usagees, 
1985-2 1 E.C.R. 531. 
 73.  Case C-302/86, Comm’n v. Denmark (Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607 
(1989). 
 74.  Id. at 632.  The Danish law did allow the first 3,000 hl of beer or soft drink 
product per producer to be imported in a non-approved container.  Id. at 630. 
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it focused on the additional expense that an importer would have to incur 
by choosing a Danish government pre-approved container.75  Although the 
ECJ sympathized with the Danish government’s attempt at preserving the 
environment, the ECJ found that there were other, less restrictive ways to 
accomplish the same goal.76 For example, the law could simply require 
importers to show that their containers could be reused without forcing 
them to use a preapproved container.77 
The arguments supporting the “public health” clause of Article 36 (ex 
30, 36) were likely exhausted by the German government in Re Purity 
Requirements for Beer, where the ECJ struck down a combination of 
German laws that made it difficult for foreign beer producers to import 
into Germany under the designation of “Bier” and thus are a violation of 
Article 34 (ex 28, 30).78 
The German law imposed numerous requirements on beer producers 
before any beer product could become eligible for sale in Germany. For 
example, German beer production regulation required specific ingredients 
for both “bottom-fermented” beers, (malted barley, hops, yeast, and water) 
and “top-fermented” beers (malts, pure cane sugar, and other sugars).79  In 
addition to the required set of ingredients, another body of German law 
prohibited the use of additives in products that were to be sold as “Bier.”80  
However, it was possible for the German government to grant an 
exception based on a specific list.81 
The German government defended this collection of purity laws on 
several grounds.  First, the government argued that the ban on additives 
was necessary to ensure public health—the ECJ found this argument 
hollow, as Germany put forth virtually zero limits on additives in soft 
drinks.82  In response, Germany contended that additives in beer pose a 
greater danger for Germans because beer is consumed in such large 
quantities, compared to soft drinks, and that the long-term health effects 
 
 75.  Id. at 631. 
 76.  Id. at 632. 
 77.  Id. at 632. 
 78.  Comm’n v. Ger. (Re Purity Requirements for Beer), 1 C.M.L.R. 780, 801–03, 
811 (1988). 
 79.  Id. at 801. 
 80.  Id. at 802.  The German law also defined the term “additive.”  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 801.  The list of exceptions included the manufacture of special beers, 
beers for export, and beer intended for scientific experiments. Id. 
 82.  Id. at 805, 808. 
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of these additives, especially in conjunction with alcohol, is unknown.83  
Although the ECJ seemed more sympathetic to this latter argument, it 
found the rule in question to be disproportionate since the German 
government did not ban the use of the additives in other food products.84 
The second argument put forth by the German government was the 
more traditional consumer protection argument. The government asserted 
that the German population attaches the term “Bier” to a specific product 
made with specific ingredients identified by German law.85  The ECJ 
rejected this argument by stating that labeling requirements could adequately 
protect consumers and allow them to make an informed choice.86  Again, 
the German government countered. Germany argued that not all beer 
containers could adequately fit a label that includes all of the ingredients 
and further, that products sold on draft the labels would actually require 
the labels to be located on the taps.87  The ECJ found that such a system 
would be adequate and that German law could be developed as to give 
consumers the necessary information in other ways.88 
The ECJ returned to cost concerns for manufacturers to strike down 
domestic law in the face of Article 34 (ex 28, 30) in Re the Use of 
Champagne-Type Bottles.89  Here, the case concerned the importation into 
Germany of Petillant de Raisin, which is an alcoholic beverage with an 
alcohol content of rarely more than 3%, but was sold in a champagne-style 
bottle in violation of Germany’s Wine Act.90  The German government 
argued that by allowing the importer to sell this product in Germany 
packaged in such a bottle, consumers would be easily confused into believing 
they are were purchasing champagne.91  The ECJ rejected the government’s 
argument by stating that producers of Petillant de Raisin, which is 
traditionally packaged in a champagne bottle in the country of origin, 
would face higher costs in that they would have to choose a bottle that 
would fit only the German market.92  As well, the ECJ contended that simple 
labeling requirements would be adequate to protect against consumer 
confusion.93  The Court did not believe Article 36 (ex 30, 36) permitted 
 
 83.  Id. at 808–09. 
 84.  Id. at 810. 
 85.  Id. at 807. 
 86.  Id. at 807–08. 
 87.  Id. at 808. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Case C-179/85, Comm’n v. Germany (Re the Use of Champagne-Type Bottles), 
1 C.M.L.R. 135, 144 (1988). 
 90.  Id. at 141–42. 
 91.  Id. at 143. 
 92.  See id. at 142–43. One could only imagine the additional costs for importers 
that forced into using a separate designed bottle for each and every member-state. 
 93.  Id. 
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Germany’s request that the producer/importer of Petillant de Raisin prove 
that it could not afford the additional costs of a different bottle.94 
In Ahokainen and Leppik, the ECJ stated that it was up to national courts 
to decide whether a Finnish rule requiring a license to import beverages 
with alcohol content above 80% could be justified under Article 36 (ex 
30, 36).95  Specifically, the ECJ stated that national courts should have the 
ability to determine whether the licensing system was the least restrictive 
measure a member-state could employ to mitigate the public health concerns 
associated with high rates of alcoholism in Finland, especially among 
youths.96 
Nevertheless, the ECJ had no trouble finding that the alcohol import 
licensing system employed by Finland was indeed a violation of Article 
34’s (ex 28, 30) prohibition on regulations limiting the free movement of 
goods.97  When discussing the balance between Articles 34 and 36, the 
ECJ acknowledged that the mere imposition of an import licensing system 
on goods that are legal and made and marketed within the EU member-
states could impose a cost to the importer that serves as an obstacle to the 
free movement of goods.98  However, according to the ECJ, in order to 
support a restriction under Article 36, a member-state must put forth 
evidence that the restrictive measure is proportional to the objective sought 
and that there is no discrimination between imported and domestically 
produced goods.99  The ECJ did not find Finland’s alcohol import licensing 
scheme to be per se discriminatory.100 
While the ECJ left open the possibility that Finland’s alcohol import 
policy would stand (by leaving the question to the member-state national 
courts), the ECJ remarked that the domestic court could take into 
consideration particular social circumstances unique to the regulating 
member-state.101  The ECJ made these findings despite case law cited by 
the ECJ that previously held that such licensing systems could be 
 
 94.  Id. at 144. 
 95.  Case C-434/04, Jan-Erik Anders Ahokainen and Mati Leppik v. Finland, 2006 
E.C.R. I-9171, ¶ 39. 
 96.  Id. ¶¶ 25, 39–40. 
 97.  Id. ¶ 22. 
 98.  Id. ¶ 35. 
 99.  Id. ¶¶ 29, 31. 
 100.  Id. ¶ 30. 
 101.  Id. ¶ 32. 
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disproportionate to a member-state’s goals, even with regard to the protection 
of human health.102 
The ECJ has held that a member-state cannot prohibit the marketing of 
foodstuffs containing added vitamins and minerals when those same 
foodstuffs are lawfully produced and marketed in other member-states 
unless there is proof of a public health risk by the prohibiting member-
state pursuant to Articles 34 (ex 28, 30) and 36 (ex 30, 36).103  In the case 
at bar, Denmark prohibited the importation of enriched foodstuffs unless 
the importer’s product(s) were shown to include nutrients that were 
needed by the Danish population.104  First, the government of Denmark 
defended the prohibition by contending that the safety of the vitamins and 
minerals that served to enrich the imported foodstuffs could not be 
determined with sufficient certainty.105  Second, the Danish government 
argued that the imported foodstuffs are not necessary because they do not 
meet a real dietary need in Denmark.106  Third, while not disputing the 
fact that the ban would serve as the equivalent to a quantitative measure, 
the Danish government argued that a member-state need not establish a 
real risk associated with the relevant product because doing so, according 
to the government, would be impossible.107  More narrowly, Denmark 
contended that ingesting great amounts of the enriching vitamins and 
minerals could be severe enough that the danger to human health could 
not be excluded even if scientific research was not able to clearly identify 
risk or the absence thereof.108 
The European Commission, which brought the complaint, believed that 
the Danish prohibition was an “unjustified obstacle,” pursuant to Articles 
34 and 36, because a lack of nutritional need was not a sufficient basis for 
prohibition.109 Rather, the European Commission argued, a prohibiting 
member-state should have the burden of showing that such products pose 
a real threat to public health.110  According to the European Commission, 
the prohibiting member-state must present scientific data supporting the 
existence of a real threat to public health as a basis for prohibition.111  
 
 102.  Id. ¶ 34. 
 103.  Case C-192/01, Comm’n v. Den., 2003 E.C.R. I-9724, ¶¶ 48, 57. 
 104.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 105.  Id. ¶ 14. However, the Danish government did cite that the mix of vitamins A, 
D, and B6, even in low doses, could have a toxic effect.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 108.  Id. ¶ 29. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. 
 111.  Id. ¶ 15. 
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Moreover, without such proof, Article 36 could not support such a ban.112  
The European Commission also contended that any such prohibition on the 
importation of enriched foodstuffs should be necessary for the protection 
of public health.113 
The ECJ began its decision with the traditional language that the free 
movement of goods is fundamental to TFEU and that any quantitative 
restrictions, or their equivalents, would violate Article 34.114  After quickly 
holding that the Danish law has the equivalent effect of a quantitative 
restriction on the free movement of goods under Article 34, the ECJ stated 
that member-states have significant discretion in determining what is 
necessary for public health, especially in cases where EU law has not been 
harmonized.115  Regardless, according to the ECJ, strict compliance with 
Article 36 requires member-states to narrowly tailor prohibitions so that 
they prohibit only that which is absolutely necessary to maintain public 
health, and show that less restrictive alternative measures are insufficient.116 
The ECJ set the burden of proof bar at a level whereby the prohibiting 
member-state must show that international scientific research involving 
the member-state’s nutritional habits reflects a need to for the prohibition of 
such foodstuffs.117  Furthermore, such proof requires a detailed assessment of 
the risks maintained associated by with the foodstuffs’ entry into the 
member-state’s marketplace.118  As well, the scientific research must be 
current to show that the prohibition was needed at the time the ban was 
enacted.119  However, the ECJ did give member-states room to evaluate 
the addition of foodstuffs into the current national diet, the varying quantity 
of added nutrients, the various sources of nutrients and their cumulative 
effect (despite whether they are from a natural or unnatural source), and 
the actual dietary needs of the population.120  While finding that the 
Danish law was disproportionate to the perceived need to protect public 
health, the ECJ stated that the law should fail largely due to the fact that 
 
 112.  Id. ¶ 20. 
 113.  Id. ¶ 24. 
 114.  Id. ¶¶ 38–39. 
 115.  Id. ¶¶ 40, 42–43. 
 116.  Id. ¶¶ 45, 46. 
 117.  Id. ¶ 46. 
 118.  Id. ¶ 47. 
 119.  Id. ¶ 48. 
 120.  Id. ¶¶ 48, 50, 54. 
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the government did not specify the risks associated with each vitamin and 
minerals to public health.121 
In a case that reflected Italy’s love for pasta, the ECJ held in Criminal 
Proceedings Against Zoni that a member-state cannot prohibit the importation 
of pasta that is made from raw ingredients that are not normally used 
in that member-state on the grounds of consumer protection and unknown 
health effects.122  At the time the case arose, the law on pasta in Italy 
provided that dry pasta made from common wheat or a mixture of common 
wheat and durum wheat could not be imported into Italy.123  However, 
common wheat pasta could be used for export and small-scale preparation 
of fresh pasta (for immediate consumption).124  Zoni, the defendant, after 
being charged with importing pasta made from a combination of common 
wheat and durum wheat in Germany, argued the Italian law violated the 
free movement of goods requirement under Article 34 (ex 28, 30) and 
could not be tolerated as derogation under Article 36 (ex 30, 36).125 
Italy attempted to defend its pasta law on several grounds.  First, the 
Italian government argued that common wheat pasta or pasta made from 
a mixture of different types of wheat is generally mixed with additives 
and colorants to create a particular color and flavor which, if ingested in 
large quantities, could create harmful effects on humans.126  Second, Italy 
believed it to be necessary to require that all dry pasta be made from 
durum wheat in order to protect Italian consumers by maintaining a 
superior quality of pasta.127  Third, Italy believed that requiring labels 
reflecting the raw ingredients in the marketed pasta would not suffice 
since, in Italy, the term “pasta” presupposes that the pasta purchased is 
made from durum wheat.128  Fourth, Italy stated that even with labeling 
requirements, it would not be possible for Italian consumers to actually 
check the accuracy of the labeling.129  Fifth, the Italian government argued 
that by requiring dry pasta to be made from durum wheat, the government 
was guaranteeing income for durum wheat growers who might otherwise 
only grow common wheat and consequently eliminate durum wheat from 
the marketplace.130 
 
 121.  Id. ¶ 55. 
 122.  Case C-90/86, Criminal Proceedings Against Zoni, 1988 E.C.R. I-4285,  ¶¶ 20, 
28. 
 123.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 4. 
 124.  Id. ¶ 3. 
 125.  See id. ¶¶ 2, 6. 
 126.  Id. ¶ 12. 
 127.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 128.  Id. ¶ 19. 
 129.  See id. ¶ 21. 
 130.  Id. ¶ 23. 
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After quickly finding that the Italian law constituted an equivalent to a 
quantitative restriction pursuant to Article 34, the ECJ turned its attention to 
the many arguments put forth by Italy as the government attempted to 
save its pasta law.131  First, the ECJ noted that Italy had no evidence that 
common wheat pasta or mixed pasta would contain additives or 
colorants.132  Second, the ECJ found the Italian pasta law violated the 
principle of proportionality because it was not necessary to ban common 
wheat or mixed pasta in an attempt to protect human health.133  Third, the 
ECJ gave much more credence to the ability of labels, a less restrictive 
alternative, to inform Italian consumers of the contents of dry pasta when 
they make purchasing decisions.134 The ECJ also commented that Italy 
could require highly detailed labels.135  Finally, the ECJ remarked that 
differences in pasta should exist in the marketplace and that consumer 
preferences should be allowed to dictate the winning pasta through 
competition and not the fear of loss of a specific type of wheat grown in 
Italy.136 
In a similar case, the ECJ found that a German law prohibiting the 
importation and domestic sale of meat products that contained ingredients 
other than meat infringed upon Articles 34 (ex 28, 30) and 36 (ex 30, 
36).137  In the case at bar, the German government attempted to defend its 
importation ban on such products as it was necessary to protect the health 
of German consumers by making sure that the population ingests sufficient 
amounts of protein.138  Moreover, the German government argued that 
vegetable proteins, presumably added to meat products, have a lower 
nutritional value than strict meat proteins in all-meat products.139  Third, 
Germany stated that German eating habits, which have existed for several 
decades, require strict meat products and that this is what German consumers 
have come to expect.140  Lastly, the German government contended that 
 
 131.  Id. ¶ 11. 
 132.  Id. ¶ 13. 
 133.  Id. ¶ 14. 
 134.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 135.  Id. ¶¶ 17, 20.  Such a label could be “pasta made from durum wheatmeal.”  Id. 
¶ 17.  The ECJ also commented that the Italian government also uses pasta in a generic 
form so that pasta does not infer that it is made from only durum wheat.  Id. at ¶ 20. 
 136.  Id. ¶ 27. 
 137.  Case C-274/87, Comm’n v. Ger., 1989 E.C.R. 229, ¶¶ 2, 23. 
 138.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 139.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 140.  Id. ¶ 12. 
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the ban was necessary in order to protect producers and distributors of 
meat products from unfair competition as some meat-product traders may 
market meat products that have non-meat ingredients and will undercut 
higher-grade producers and that consumers would not readily see the 
differences.141 
The ECJ, while acknowledging the primacy of a member-state’s 
obligation and duty to protect human health, first cited the German 
government’s own reports detailing that the protein intake of the German 
population was more than adequate.142  The ECJ also stated that importation 
bans such as Germany’s ban on meat products with non-meat ingredients 
cannot be justified under Article 36 on grounds that the imports will have 
a lower nutritional content than what is currently on the market, since 
consumers should be able to maintain choices regarding nutritional value.143  
Next, the ECJ contended that any consumer confusion as to the true content 
of meat products could be removed through the compulsory requirement 
of labels on the products’ packaging.144  In regard to the protection of 
German meat producers and distributors, the ECJ again believed that 
compulsory labeling of meat products would be ample to inform consumers.145 
D.  Obscenity 
Conegate Limited v. HM Customs forced the ECJ to address geographical 
differences within the same member-state on the subject of public 
morality.146  In Conegate Limited, a German-based importer challenged a 
British restriction on the importation of inflatable sex dolls and other 
sexual items that were deemed indecent or obscene.147  Although the ECJ 
articulated that a member-state is free to dictate its own standards when 
defining public morality, the United Kingdom—comprised of England, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales—maintained different rules as to 
whether those same inflatable sex dolls were lawful.148 
The question for the ECJ was whether a member-state could exercise a 
restriction on the importation of indecent or obscene items when, at the 
same time, no general prohibition existed on the manufacture or sale of 
those same items within the member-state, even when the regulation of 
 
 141.  Id. ¶ 17. 
 142.  Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. 
 143.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 144.  Id. ¶ 13. 
 145.  Id. ¶ 18. 
 146.  Case C-121/85, Conegate Ltd. v. HM Customs, 1986 E.C.R. 1007. 
 147.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 148.  Id. ¶¶ 8–10, 12. 
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those items varied by political region.149  The ECJ answered the question 
in the negative and stated that Article 36 (ex 30, 36) would not support 
public morality derogation in such circumstances even when, despite the 
differences in regulation across political regions, there did exist a general 
prohibition on some forms of advertising.150  Moreover, the ECJ reminded 
the litigants that under no circumstances could a member-state impose 
regulations on imports that are stricter than those imposed on domestically 
produced goods.151  However, the ECJ did state that once the goods from 
Germany were imported into the United Kingdom, the same general 
restrictions on marketing and advertising would apply to the imported 
goods as they apply to the domestically produced goods.152 
E.  Advertising 
In Lucien Ortscheit GmbH v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, the ECJ upheld, 
pursuant to Article 36 (ex 30, 36) (and specifically on public health  
grounds), a German advertising ban on pharmaceuticals imported into 
Germany whereby the same pharmaceuticals that were not authorized in 
Germany could be imported into Germany.153  In the case at bar, one 
pharmaceutical firm, Lucien Ortscheit, attempted to block the importation of 
pharmaceuticals advertised by Eurim-Pharm, another pharmaceutical 
firm, using a German law that prohibited the advertising of such unauthorized 
pharmaceuticals.154  Interestingly enough, the German ban on advertising 
applied to pharmaceuticals that were authorized for sale in another 
member-state but were not authorized in Germany.155  Eurim-Pharm, for 
several years, had been marketing pharmaceuticals in Germany that were 
not authorized by the German government in advertisements, which 
specifically identified which pharmaceuticals were not authorized in 
Germany, directed at healthcare professionals.156 
Although not specifically identified in the case, but revealed in the 
ECJ’s description of the Advocate General’s position, the German government 
 
 149.  Id. ¶ 13. 
 150.  Id. ¶ 20. 
 151.  Id. ¶ 12. 
 152.  See id. ¶ 21. 
 153.  Case C-390/23, Lucien Ortscheit GmbH v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. 
I-5257, ¶¶ 12, 20–21. 
 154.  Id. ¶¶ 5–7. 
 155.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 156.  Id. ¶ 6. 
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defended the advertising ban on public health grounds; more specifically, 
that individual importation of unauthorized pharmaceuticals would remain 
infrequent and manufacturers could not gain approval for such pharmaceuticals 
in member-states where fewer requirements existed.157  While supporting 
the German advertising ban, the ECJ made note that given the lack of 
harmonization in the area of pharmaceutical advertising, member-states 
maintained much more discretion in crafting regulations on the marketing 
and advertising of pharmaceutical products.158  This position taken by the 
ECJ coincided with the reminder that the protection of human health is 
among the most important interests protected by Article 36 despite the 
acknowledgement that such an advertising ban would limit the ability of 
healthcare providers to have access to information about the existence and 
availability pharmaceuticals that can actually be used in Germany.159 
F.  Health Screening 
Whether a member-state can impose a higher standard for public health 
than what is established by EU law pursuant to Article 36 (ex 30, 36) was 
the question presented in Austria v. Hahn.160  EU law on the marketing of 
fish products was found in Directive 91/493/EEC, which required that 
such products caught in a natural environment would be subject to various 
health checks, including organoleptic, parasite, chemical, and microbiological 
evaluations.161  Additionally, Directive 91/493/EEC required that these 
checks take place in any place whereby fish products were “prepared, 
processed, chilled, frozen, packaged, or stored.”162  However, despite this 
specificity, the Directive did not identify standards for member-states to 
follow.163  EU Decision 94/356, which compliments Directive 91/493/EEC, 
however, did specify that potential hazards associated with fish products 
would include unacceptable contamination through biological organisms, 
chemicals, other raw materials, other final products, and/or contamination 
through a production line.164  Moreover, Decision 94/356 provided that 
multidisciplinary teams should consider what control measures to put in 
place and that such control measures should be employed to prevent 
health hazards.165 
 
 157.  Id. ¶ 19. 
 158.  Id. ¶ 18. 
 159.  Id. ¶¶ 10, 16. 
 160.  See Case C-121/00, Austria v. Hahn, 2002 E.C.R. I-9210, ¶¶ 20, 21. 
 161.  Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
 162.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 163.  Id. ¶¶ 3–6. 
 164.  Id. ¶ 8. 
 165.  Id. ¶ 9. 
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Austrian law, however, was much more specific on the topic of fish 
related products.  Austrian law prohibited the marketing of foodstuffs and 
products intended for human consumption that are likely to endanger or harm 
human health.166  More specifically, Austrian law provided a “zero tolerance” 
policy in regard to contamination of food products by way of listeria 
monocytogenes in that if this form of contamination was detected at 
greater than 25 grams, the fish products could not be marketed in Austria, 
as they would be deemed harmful to human health.167 
Nordsee GmbH, the defendant in the case, was charged with violating 
the Austrian standards on fish products.168  Nordsee contended that 
Austria’s identification of fish products as harmful to human health if they 
contained listeria monocytogenes at 25 grams or more (per sample size) 
was the equivalent to a quantitative restriction in violation of Article 34 
and could not be saved by Article 36 since the restriction was not 
proportionate even in cases where EU law had not been harmonized.169  
Nordsee cited a 1996 U.S. Center for Disease Control study finding that 
very few persons that ingested even low levels of listeria monocytogenes 
became ill and thus the Austrian standard was too strict, and therefore, an 
equivalent to a quantitative restriction existed.170 
The Austrian government, in contrast, stated that EU law, including 
Directive 91/493 and Decision 94/356 did not fully harmonize EU law on 
the topic of safety in fish products but merely set objectives for member-
states to follow given the terms “unacceptable contamination” and 
“acceptable levels.”171 
Ironically, the Austrian court that referred the case to the ECJ could not 
find a scientific basis for a zero tolerance policy for listeria monocytogenes 
in that such a form of contamination is wide spread in the environment 
generally and in food production specifically. Even in good food production 
conditions, few clinical cases of harm were realized, and it would be almost 
impossible to remove listeria monocytogenes from the food production 
process.172 
 
 166.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 167.  Id. ¶¶ 16–18. 
 168.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 169.  Id. ¶¶ 22–23. 
 170.  Id. ¶ 25. 
 171.  Id. ¶¶ 26–27. 
 172.  Id. ¶ 19. 
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The ECJ held that Austria was within its power under Article 36 to 
impose stricter standards to protect human health in the area of fish products, 
even at a “zero tolerance” level.173  The ECJ agreed with the plaintiff that 
Directive 91/493 and Decision 94/356 harmonized EU law in a way that 
could prohibit member-states from setting high standards for human health 
when not justified.174  Although the ECJ commented that Articles 34 and 
36 do not immunize a member-state’s strict standards for protecting human 
health, the doctrine of proportionality must apply to such restrictions. The 
effect of the Austrian law would be to limit the trade in fish products between 
member-states, and any such limitation must be based on scientific research. 
The ECJ cited several health problems that current international scientific 
research has identified in regard to human consumption of listeria 
monocytogenes.175  As well, the ECJ stated that current research did not 
identify a specific level of listeria monocytogenes that would be safe for 
human consumption.176 
Differences in climate can determine whether food protected with 
pesticides can be blocked from importation between member-states.177  In 
Mirepoix, the ECJ allowed France to block the import of fruit and 
vegetables once covered with a pesticide, maleic hydrazide (a synthetic 
chemical), which were grown in the Netherlands due to a French law that 
prohibited the use of the pesticide because of toxic residue likely to be 
found on such treated products.178  The defendant contested his prosecution 
by the French authorities, arguing that the French ban on the pesticide was 
a violation of the free movement of goods under Article 34 (ex 28, 30) 
and the ban did not fall into the exceptions found in Article 36 (ex 30, 36). 
According to the defendant, (i) there was no certainty that the pesticide 
could harm humans, (ii) the French law went beyond what was necessary 
to protect human health, and (iii) other methods associated with food safety 
could have been implemented.179 
The ECJ found that the French pesticide ban did constitute the 
equivalent of a quantitative restriction on the free movement of goods, but 
since the quantities ingested by consumers could not be predicted, the ECJ 
held that member-states could prohibit food protected with a banned 
pesticide from entering its borders.180  The ECJ went as far as to comment 
 
 173.  Id. ¶ 47. 
 174.  Id. ¶¶ 32–33. 
 175.  Id. ¶¶ 34, 36, 39–41.  The ECJ specifically identified risks to pregnant women 
and the elderly.  Id. ¶ 41. 
 176.  Id. ¶ 45. 
 177.  Case 54/85, Ministere Public v. Xavier Mirepoix, 1986 E.C.R. 1074, ¶¶ 15, 18. 
 178.  Id. ¶¶ 2–3, 8. 
 179.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 180.  Id. ¶¶ 12, 14. 
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that a member-state can take into consideration its own climate, the normal 
diet of its citizens, and the general state of health of its citizens.181 
However, the ECJ did place limitations on banning products treated 
with a banned pesticide.  Any member-state blocking the importation of 
such food products must first consider any reasons as to why the ban is no 
longer necessary.182  Second, the member-state must allow for exceptions 
whereby the importer may contest that the pesticide is dangerous to human 
health.183 
The ECJ in Humanplasma GmbH v. Austria stated that “human health 
ranks foremost among the assets or interest protected by Article 36 (ex 30, 
36).”184  As one can imagine, the possibility of tainted blood moving from 
one member-state to another in the stream of commerce would pose a 
substantial risk and therefore member-states might have the greatest 
leeway for regulation.  However, in Humanplasma, the ECJ found that 
Austria’s requirement that all traders in blood and blood products supply 
proof that all blood donors received no compensation violated Article 30’s 
(ex 28, 30) prohibition against regulations that possess the equivalent 
effect of a quantitative restriction and could not be saved by Article 36 (ex 
30, 36).185 
In a rare instance, the defending member-state—here, Austria—agreed 
that the requirement that all traders in blood related products have proof 
that all blood donors received no compensation was a restriction that 
could limit trade in goods between member-states.186  However, the ECJ 
did not find that the Austrian regulation on trade in blood products was 
discriminatory.187  As well, the ECJ found that virtually all parties included 
in the case at bar agreed that the true mission of the Austrian regulation 
was to ensure that blood products were safe and of high quality and 
encouraging voluntary, unpaid donations to which the ECJ stated were 
potentially grounds for saving the regulation under Article 36.188 
The ECJ, however, kept to its case law that required, even in the case 
of blood products moving between and among member-states, that any 
 
 181.  Id. ¶ 15. 
 182.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 183.  Id. ¶ 17. 
 184.  Case C-421/09, Humanplasma GmbH v. Austria, 2010 E.C.R. I-2389, ¶ 32. 
 185.  Id. ¶ 46.  The Austrian law prohibited the importation of blood products from 
compensated donors and required proof of such from importers.  Id. ¶¶ 8–10, 15. 
 186.  Id. ¶ 30. 
 187.  Id. ¶ 28. 
 188.  Id. ¶ 33. 
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restriction on the free movement of goods must be proportional and 
necessary to achieve the objective sought by the regulating member-state.189  
The ECJ stated that in the area of human health protection, member-states 
are afforded discretion in determining how much protection is needed, that 
the level of protection needed may vary from member-state to member-
state, and the variation in protection from member-state to member-state 
does not create a presumption that the more restrictive regulation is not in 
compliance with EU law.190  Regardless, the fact that other member-states 
do compensate blood donors for their costs and the fact that EU law 
otherwise requires that blood and blood components be tested before 
entering the stream of commerce, the need for traders in blood products 
to obtain blood from uncompensated donors and supply proof that donors 
were not compensated was not necessary to achieve the objective of 
protecting human health.191 
V.  CASE LAW ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS FROM                                 
THE EFTA COURT 
A.  Product Contents, Composition, and Licensing 
The EFTA Court relied heavily on the ECJ’s decision in Criminal 
Proceedings Against Keck in adjudicating a Norwegian law requiring a 
license, to be granted from a Norwegian municipality, to sell videograms.192  
In Ullensaker, Nille AS, a nationwide chain of videogram sales stores, 
contested the Norwegian law was a violation of Article 11 of the EEA as 
a quantitative restriction on imports after a total of seven of its 120 stores 
were collectively denied licenses by five different Norwegian municipalities.193  
The Norwegian government argued that the licensing system, which 
would grant a license to a “specialized dealer,” was necessary in order to 
prohibit the sale of illegal videograms and also could be justified on cultural 
grounds under Article 13 in that the individual municipalities could make sure 
that there exists a diversity of videograms for sale when granting licenses.194  
The Norwegian government also contended that the licensing system did not 
distinguish between domestically and foreign-produced videograms.195  In 
 
 189.  Id. ¶ 34. 
 190.  Id. ¶¶ 39–40. 
 191.  Id. ¶¶ 43–45.  Many member-states provided donors with refreshments and 
compensation for travel costs. Id. ¶ 44. 
 192.  Ullensaker kommune and Others v. Nille AS, Case E-5/96, EFTA Ct. Rep. 30, 
¶ 3 (May 14, 1997), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/5_96_Advisory 
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contrast, Nille AS argued that the licensing system violated Article 11 
because it limited the number of retail outlets for videograms and thus 
constituted a quantitative restriction on videogram sales since many 
videograms sold in Norway are imported.196  Nille AS also argued that the 
licensing system allowed Norwegian municipalities to arbitrarily determine 
who could sell videograms.197 
Although the EFTA Court put forth a strong endorsement of the intent 
of Article 11 of the EEA Agreement and its companion Article 34 (ex 28, 
30) of TFEU, the Court found that neither article prohibits a domestic law 
that regulates selling practices as long as there is no dissimilar treatment 
between videograms produced domestically or abroad, which they found 
to be the situation here.198  Although the EFTA Court referred the case back 
to the national court for fact-finding, it held that in the event that the 
national court did find a quantitative restriction in violation of Article 11, 
the licensing system could not be upheld under Article 13 since “cultural 
policy” is not a means for exemption and that Article 11 must be “interpreted 
strictly” as is the case with its counterpart Article 36 (ex 30, 36) of the 
TFEU.199 
In a case that involved several provisions of the EEA, the EFTA Court 
held that Article 11 was not violated by the practice of Iceland’s State 
Alcohol and Tobacco Company (the “ATVR”), a government monopoly 
which serves as the sole customer of imported alcohol and has the 
exclusive right to the retail sale of alcohol, whereby imported alcohol sold 
to the ATVR must be placed on a specific ATVR-authorized pallet and 
the price of the alcohol must include the price of the pallet.200  The plaintiff, 
HOB-vin, argued that such a policy discriminated against importers since 
domestic producers of alcohol were not obligated to use the required pallet 
nor did they have to include the cost of a pallet in the cost of the alcohol, 
which gives domestic producers an advantage in the marketplace.201  In 
opposition, the Icelandic government argued that the pallets were 
required in order to keep uniformity in terms of both warehouse operation 
and price control due to the fact that if different importers used different 
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pallets, different cost structures would potentially cause discrimination among 
importers.202 
Instead of applying Article 11 of the EEA, the EFTA Court centered its 
decision on Article 16, which requires member-state granted monopolies to 
adjust their practices so that discrimination does not exist regarding the 
procurement and marketing of goods made in member-states of the EEA.203  
The EFTA Court held that Article 16 is not violated unless a national court 
finds that the policy of the monopoly is designed to treat importers 
differently from domestic producers.204 
In Tore Wilhelmsen v. Oslo Kommune, the EFTA Court found that 
Norway’s licensing system that favored domestic beer producers over 
their foreign counterparts, and a state monopoly’s sole control over beer 
with a certain alcohol by volume level was in violation of Articles 11 and 
16 of the EEA.205  The plaintiff first challenged Norway’s beer classification 
system following the denial of an application for a license that included 
three classifications of beer whereby beer with an alcohol by volume 
percentage of 4.75% or greater could only be sold by the Norwegian 
state-granted monopoly.206  However, pursuant to the classification 
system, no license was necessary to sell beer with an alcohol by volume 
percentage below 2.5%, and beer with an alcohol by volume percentage 
of between 2.5% and 4.75% could be sold by anyone who met the general 
rules for trading eligibility under Norwegian law.207  The Norwegian state-
granted monopoly, which by statute was not permitted to discriminate 
between suppliers and products based on country of origin, could not produce 
alcoholic beverages and was therefore dependent upon seeking suppliers for 
its retail outlets.208 
The EFTA Court held that the 4.75% designation could be a violation 
of Article 11 if the national court could find that trade patterns between 
domestic and foreign producers of beer were different, even though the 
EFTA Court found that the designation was set in order to develop two 
separate tax schemes and not for the purpose of discriminating against 
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foreign beer producers.209  However, the EFTA Court did state that if the 
designation could be justified on public health grounds, Article 13 may 
allow for the designation in an attempt to combat alcohol abuse.210  
Regardless, the EFTA Court did not find the 4.75% designation 
permissible under Article 13 in light of the ECJ’s decision in Criminal 
Proceedings Against Keck.211  Additionally, the EFTA Court stated that 
the Norwegian state-granted monopoly and the rules that govern its 
operation could still be in violation of Articles 11 and 16 despite the fact 
that, by statute, it was designed not to treat domestic and foreign beer 
producers differently.212  Indeed, the EFTA Court found Article 11 to be 
specifically violated since foreign beer producers were denied a license to 
sell 4.75% beer while domestic producers did not have to apply for such 
a license.213 
Norway’s ban on the importation of fortified cornflakes was at issue in 
EFTA v. Norway.214  Here, the Norwegian Food Control Authority, 
exercising its power under Article 13, attempted to prohibit the 
importation and marketing of Kellogg’s Corn Flakes due to the fact that 
the flakes were fortified with four vitamins and minerals including 
thiamine, riboflavin, niacin, and iron despite the fact that the flakes had 
been widely manufactured, sold, and marketed in other EEA member-
states.215  Norway put forth several reasons justifying its ban, including 
that only authorized nutrients were needed by the Norwegian population’s 
diet, that extensive use of fortification would lead to an unbalanced level 
of nutrients, that it would put consumers at risk if the fortified nutrients 
were advertised without providing the total nutritional value of the 
product, that basic foodstuffs should be manufactured only with high-
nutritional value raw materials, and that the addition of nutrients to cereals 
was not obligatory in any Nordic country.216  The Norwegian Health Ministry 
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added that free fortification practices could lead to additional products on 
the market that would create a risk to public health, and that the principle 
of non-discrimination in the trade in goods would require a member-state 
to allow the importation of all fortified food items if just one were 
allowed.217 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority brought a complaint against Norway 
pursuant to Article 11, stating that in order for the fortified cornflakes ban 
to be upheld under Article 13, Norway would have to demonstrate that the 
product created a health risk.218  In reply, Norway stated that it could 
produce scientific research to show that by eating fortified goods in an 
uncontrollable and unforeseen amounts, a health hazard could exist, but 
not that any one product alone gave rise to health hazards.219  Finally, the 
Norwegian government contended that the precautionary principle could 
be applied to such products because less restrictive measures, such as 
labelling, would not work since consumers are unlikely to have the knowledge 
necessary to calculate health effects associated with the nutrients found in 
all dietary sources.220 
The EFTA Court made mention that the European Commission and the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority agree that nutritional need alone is not a 
justification to block a product’s importation and marketing on public 
health grounds.221  The Surveillance Authority also contended that the 
cornflakes ban is inconsistent, since Norway has allowed other fortified 
goods to be produced and marketed within its borders and that such a ban 
can only be justified by way of international scientific research and the 
prevailing eating habits of the member-state.222 
Ultimately, the EFTA Court found that Norway’s ban on the importation 
and marketing of fortified cornflakes was a violation of Article 11 and was 
not permissible under Article 13.223  The EFTA Court, while determining that 
the food product and its associated marketing in the case at bar was covered 
under EEA Agreement, stated that an EEA member-state is authorized to 
ban the importation and marketing of fortified foodstuffs so long as Article 
13’s requirements are met, which can include an assessment of the Norwegian 
diet.224  The EFTA Court stated that the member-state imposing a ban 
based on public health should be granted leeway in doing so, but must 
balance that ban with the fundamental requirements of EEA law and 
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scientific research. Further, the EFTA Court concluded that any such 
decision to ban goods should be subject to judicial review.225  Moreover, 
the scientific evidence must be proportionate, non-discriminatory, transparent, 
and consistent with other measures taken to protect public health in that 
member-state.226  According to its view of the proportionality principle, the 
EFTA Court agreed with the Surveillance Authority and the European 
Commission that the lack of a nutritional need cannot support an import 
ban under the EEA Agreement, a particularly restrictive measure, especially 
when the banned good is freely available in the EEA.227 
Regarding scientific research, the EFTA Court held that insufficient, 
inconclusive, and imprecise scientific conclusions cannot be used to support 
the precautionary principle, and thus less restrictive measures would have 
to be taken by the member-state, and further, a zero-risk policy cannot be 
pursued except under the most exceptional circumstances.228  However, 
although the EFTA Court found no reason to believe that Norway’s ban 
was motivated by economic protectionism, it did find that the reason for 
the ban was based chiefly on the lack of need in the Norwegian diet for 
fortified nutrients and that if one such fortified food product were allowed 
entry into Norway, others must be made eligible for import.229  It was the 
EFTA Court’s belief that both grounds were faulty since the concern over 
lack of need for nutrients does not address the essential elements of Article 
13 and that any application for importation into a member-state can be 
evaluated only on the merits of that specific good.230 
EEA member-states that require building materials used in government 
contracts are manufactured in that member-state also run afoul of Article 
11 and Article 13.231  In Fagtun ehf, the EFTA Court found that Iceland’s 
requirement that building materials (in this case, roofing elements) to be used 
in a government contract to construct school buildings be approved by the 
Icelandic government was an unlawful regulation serving as the equivalent 
effect of a quantitative restriction that could not be saved. The EFTA 
Court concluded this on the grounds that public safety concerns mandate 
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that the Icelandic government supervise the construction of those materials 
given the unique weather conditions in Iceland.232 
In reaching its decision, the EFTA Court first had to deal with the 
preliminary issue of whether a “building committee,” which set the 
parameters for the public works contract, was operating on behalf of the 
government for the purposes of Article 11.233  Although the Icelandic 
government tried to argue otherwise, the EFTA Court believed that the 
building committee was operating on behalf of the Icelandic government, the 
City of Reykjavik, and the Municipality of Mosfellsbaer, since all three 
forms of government selected the members of the building committee and all 
three levels of government owned the school buildings that were subject 
to the regulations at bar.234 
In finding that an Article 11 violation existed, the EFTA Court took 
notice of several facts.  First, there was no determination on the part of the 
Icelandic government as to whether the roofing materials, made in Norway 
and imported into Iceland, would meet the standards set by Iceland’s 
building regulations, nor was there an evaluation as to whether the roofing 
materials would qualify for an exemption.235  Second, the EFTA Court 
noted that the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the European Commission 
both believed that any such regulation that requires materials to be used in 
public works contracts be manufactured in the member-state that establishes 
the public works project is a form of discrimination against foreign 
production.236  Third, the EFTA Court cited case law from its own 
jurisprudence, as well as the ECJ, holding that any such restrictions on the 
free movement of goods, direct or indirect, actually or potentially, would 
serve as an unlawful limitation of Article 11 of the EEA Agreement and 
Article 34 (ex 28, 30) of TFEU.237  In the end, the EFTA Court found the 
Icelandic building regulation to be a blatant form of discrimination in that 
the regulation expressly favored national production and excluded all 
possible use of imported goods.238 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority and the European Commission 
decided that Article 13 could not save the Article 11 infraction because 
the discrimination was so overt.239  Adding to that sentiment, the EFTA 
Court also found that the Icelandic government should have the burden of 
proof to show that only the domestically produced roofing elements could 
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provide the necessary protection in Iceland’s weather, which the government 
failed to achieve.240 
B.  Advertising 
The enforcement of a copyright, even in an attempt to protect the health 
and safety of potential users of a pharmaceutical, cannot be justified under 
Article 13.241  In Astra Norge, the namesake plaintiff brought proceedings 
against the Norwegian government to prohibit the latter from issuing 
Summaries of Product Characteristics (“SPC”) on Astra Norge’s products 
that were brought into Norway through parallel import.242  Specifically, 
Astra Norge stated that it had a national copyright on the SPC it prepared 
that could not be duplicated by the Norwegian government as was Norway’s 
practice in an attempt to comply with its own Medicinal Products Act, 
which required an SPC on all imported medicinal products.243  It is implied, 
but not specifically stated in the case, that if Astra Norge could enforce its 
copyright on the SPC it created and prevent the Norwegian government 
from applying it to parallel imports, the parallel importer would be prohibited 
from operating in the Norwegian market. 
The EFTA Court’s opinion largely focused on the issue concerning a 
potential limitation on the free movement of goods in violation of Article 
11 through an assertion of a copyright, instead of the public health concern 
that might justify an exception to Article 11 through Article 13.244  Both 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the European Commission contended 
that the enforcement of a copyright on behalf of Astra Norge would be a 
violation of Article 11’s free movement guarantee and could not be saved 
under Article 13’s set of exceptions.245 
According to the EFTA Court, and pursuant to European Union 
Directive 83/570/EEC, the purpose of an SPC was to protect a consumer’s 
health through an authorization system whereby any medicinal product 
would have to possess an SPC to be eligible for sale in a member-state, 
and while the manufacturer of the drug product can write the SPC, the 
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 241.  Norwegian Government v. Astra Norge AS, Case E-1/98, EFTA Ct. Rep. 140, 
¶ 26 (Nov. 24, 1998), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/1_98 
_Advisory_Opinion_EN.pdf. 
 242.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 243.  Id. ¶¶ 2–4, 15. 
 244.  Id. ¶ 14. 
 245.  Id. ¶ 15. 
TUDORADA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  1:50 PM 
 
106 
contents of the SPC are dictated by EU law.246  This position was in 
contrast to that of Astra Norge, which argued that the SPC was largely a 
function of marketing and advertising.247  While finding that Article 13 
could not save the assertion of copyright by Astra Norge, the EFTA Court 
stated that without the ability to allow the Norwegian government to use 
the SPC from the original manufacturer/importer and place it on the 
equivalent drug that is brought into Norway by way of a parallel import, 
the parallel importer would be faced with the costs of drafting a new SPC, 
applying for approval of the SPC, and hiring a qualified pharmacist to 
participate in the process.248  Moreover, the EFTA Court stated that it might 
be impossible for the parallel importer to draft an SPC that is sufficiently 
new and different so as to not infringe on the manufacturer-direct importer’s 
copyright.249  The EFTA Court also contended that since the drug was the 
same, regardless of whether it was directly imported or imported in a 
parallel fashion, the same SPC on both sets of drugs would be desirable 
from a public health standpoint.250  In the end, the EFTA Court believed 
that the assertion of a copyright in such fashion would be incompatible 
with EEA law.251 
The link between advertising and the use of tobacco was the subject of 
Phillip Morris Norway AS v. The Norwegian State.252  In Phillip Morris, 
the Norwegian government had instituted a ban on advertising tobacco 
products as far back as 1973, but in the case at bar, the issue was whether the 
2009 ban on visual display advertising constituted an unlawful 
quantitative restriction on imports given that, although the ban applied to 
all tobacco products, importers of tobacco products would be at a disadvantage 
since firms that at one time produced tobacco products in Norway would 
have an unfair advantage due to brand loyalty.253 
The EFTA Court, in routine fashion, sought to address two questions.  
The first question was whether the prohibition on the visual display of 
tobacco products constituted an illegal measure having the equivalent 
effect of a quantitative restriction on the free movement of goods pursuant 
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to Article 11.254  Phillip Morris, the plaintiff, put forth several arguments 
as to why the EFTA Court should find a violation of Article 11.  First, the 
plaintiff stated that, although no tobacco production existed in Norway by 
2009 and the visual display ban was designed to apply to all products both 
domestic and imported, the visual display ban would favor domestic products 
over imported products since consumers would be more familiar with the 
former and this form of discrimination would be more punitive toward 
imported products.255  Second, and related, since a complete media advertising 
ban existed, the only way in which to communicate information to consumers 
was to utilize a visual display in a retail outlet.256 
Norway contended that the purpose of the visual display ban was to 
reduce tobacco consumption, recognizing a link between the advertising 
of tobacco and tobacco use, especially in regard to young persons and 
children.257  Norway also argued that neither EU, nor EEA law (although 
both addressed the advertising of tobacco) addressed visual displays, and 
thus EEA member-states have the ability to impose stricter rules.258  Third, 
Norway stated that the visual ban is not discriminatory in that it does not 
affect the free movement of goods and is instead the mere regulation of a 
selling arrangement.259 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority stated that Norway’s visual display 
ban was a regulation on a selling arrangement that applied to all traders, 
both domestic and foreign, and thus no discrimination existed.260  The 
European Commission felt that the visual display ban was a “more radical 
form of an advertising ban” and since no tobacco production exists in 
Norway, there was no quantitative restriction despite recognizing that imported 
brands would have a much more difficult pathway in penetrating the 
Norwegian market for tobacco products.261 
The EFTA Court stated that Article 11 prohibits EEA member-states 
from imposing regulations that treat imported goods differently than 
domestic goods, regulations that affect both domestic and imported goods, 
and regulations that hinder access to markets.262  The EFTA Court noted 
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that the intent of Norway’s visual display ban was not to regulate trade 
among EEA member-states, but that the ban is capable of making market 
entry very difficult for new products.263  However, the EFTA Court noted 
that if the ban were to be treated as a mere selling arrangement regulation 
that covered both domestic and imported goods, then a quantitative 
restriction is not present.264  Although the EFTA Court found that the visual 
display ban was a selling arrangement regulation, the EFTA Court held that 
the visual display ban would have a discriminatory effect on imported 
tobacco products that were continuously imported into Norway in contrast 
to those tobacco products that were previously manufactured in Norway.265  
The EFTA Court acknowledged directly that tobacco brands formerly 
produced in Norway would have an advantage, and suggested that tobacco 
could at some point be manufactured once again in Norway.266  The EFTA 
Court also stated that national courts, when addressing such an issue, must 
consider the relevant characteristics of the market and any effects of a 
visual ban on products that are new to the market.267 
The second question for the EFTA Court was whether the Article 11 
restriction could be allowed pursuant to Article 13.268  Phillip Morris 
contended that the visual display ban was not suitable for reducing tobacco 
consumption and that Norway had an obligation to adopt a less-restrictive 
approach to achieving that goal.269  Norway justified the visual display ban 
on public health grounds, asserting that the ban was proportional in that it was 
suitable to reduce tobacco consumption.270  The EFTA Court stated that 
the burden of proof in such a matter should rest with the member-state 
government. However, Norway contended that a member-state should not 
be forced to prove that no other conceivable measure could be implemented 
to meet the proportionality requirement.271 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority believed that the visual display ban 
could be justified on public health grounds pursuant to Article 13 and that 
EEA member-states should be granted a wide level of discretion on such 
matters.272  The European Commission agreed that the visual display ban was 
acceptable under Article 13 as not only necessary, but also proportionate, 
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further concluding that member-states should maintain wide discretion in 
such matters.273 
On the second question, the EFTA Court agreed that on the issue of 
whether a regulation is proportionate, a member-state should be granted a 
wide level of discretion to determine what degree of protection to give its 
citizens in the field of public health.274  Moreover, the EFTA Court 
acknowledged that this level of discretion could lead to varying levels of 
protection across the member-states, but the fact that varying levels exist 
does not make any one member-state’s level of protection disproportionate.275  
However, contrary to the beliefs of the EFTA Surveillance Authority, the 
European Commission, and Norway, the EFTA Court stated that any 
restriction on a fundamental freedom can only be justified if the restriction 
is appropriate for obtaining the objective.276  According to the EFTA 
Court, the area occupied by uncertainty in public health should allow a 
member-state to act to reduce threats to public health. Further, each EEA 
member-state should be given a presumption that it is doing what it can to 
protect human health, even if the member-state maintains the burden of 
proof.277  Although the EFTA Court believed that the visual display ban 
was acceptable under Article 13, the EFTA Court stated that such an issue 
should be resolved by a member-state’s court to determine whether a less-
restrictive measure is possible to achieve the public health goal.278 
C.  Health Concerns 
Articles 11 and 13 prohibit EEA member-states from requiring importers 
to gain permission from a member-state created alcohol monopoly before 
importing alcohol.279  In Restamark, the EFTA Court entertained a challenge 
by an importer wishing to bring several bottles of whiskey and wine into 
Finland that already existed in commerce within the EEA.280  The importer 
was required to seek, but was refused, authorization by Oy Alko Ab 
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(“OAA”), an entity created by the Finnish government maintaining a 
monopoly on the manufacture, sale, and export of alcohol in Finland.281  
The importer argued that such a permission-based restriction in the form of 
a license on the importation of alcohol in Finland was a violation of 
Article 11’s prohibition on quantitative restrictions on the free movement 
of goods and not permitted as an exception pursuant to Article 13.282  In 
contrast, the Finnish government argued that its licensing system was 
necessary to promote its general health and social policy by attempting to 
mitigate the harmful effects of alcohol.283 
The EFTA Court held that the licensing system had the same effect as 
a quantitative restriction and was thereby prohibited under Article 11.284  
According to the EFTA Court, the licensing system could be an impediment 
to trade among the EEA member-states and could create conditions of 
delay and abuse by the member-state imposing such a system.285  Moreover, 
the EFTA Court believed that the ECJ has consistently held the same 
position even when the licenses sought were granted automatically.286 
The next question was whether the alcohol import licensing system was 
permissible under Article 13 as a public health exception to Article 11.287  
The EFTA Court did not doubt Finland’s argument that the alcohol licensing 
system was designed to promote social and health concerns, but stated that 
even in cases of public health concerns, any such restriction on the free 
movement of goods must be proportionate to the goal of reducing alcohol 
consumption.288  The EFTA Court did not find evidence that the goal of 
reducing alcohol consumption could only be met by entrusting the total 
control to alcohol to one state-granted monopoly.289  The EFTA Court 
believed that the alcohol licensing system was too restrictive and thus a 
violation of Article 11 and not permitted by Article 13.290 
In Restamark, the EFTA Court also addressed the question of whether 
entrusting total control over alcohol to a state-created monopoly was a 
violation of Article 16 of the EEA Agreement, which prohibits the creation 
of state-granted monopolies that engage in discrimination based on country 
of origin in regard to the sale of goods.291  Most of the content in Article 
 
 281.  Id. ¶¶ 3, 60. 
 282.  Id. ¶ 44. 
 283.  Id. ¶¶ 53–54. 
 284.  Id. ¶ 50. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. ¶ 49. 
 287.  Id. ¶ 52. 
 288.  Id. ¶¶ 57–59. 
 289.  Id. ¶ 60. 
 290.  Id. ¶ 61. 
 291.  Id. ¶ 62.  (Article 16 of the EEA Agreement states:  
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16 of the EEA Agreement mirrors Article 37 of the TFEU.292  Specifically, 
Article 16 requires that any existing state-created monopolies be altered in a 
way that their operations do not discriminate against goods coming from 
other member-states.293  The EFTA Court held that Finland’s alcohol authority 
as the guardian of the alcohol licensing system must be adjusted to allow 
the importer in such a case to import alcohol products.294 
An argument could be made that a member-state’s gravest public health 
concern, whereby its stance that Article 13 should allow for restrictions, is 
in the area of pharmaceuticals.  However, in Grund, elli-og v. Icelandic 
Medicines Agency, the EFTA Court held that a member-state cannot require 
parallel importers of medicines to submit manufacturing control reports.295 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff was an Icelandic nursing home operator 
that purchased pharmaceuticals from a Norwegian wholesaler that purchased 
 
1. The Contracting Parties shall ensure that any State monopoly of a commercial 
character be adjusted so that no discrimination regarding the conditions under 
which goods are procured and marketed will exist between nationals of EC 
Member States and EFTA States.  2. The provisions of this Article shall apply 
to any body through which the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties, 
in law or fact, either directly or indirectly supervise, determine or appreciably 
influence imports or exports between Contracting Parties.  These provisions shall 
likewise apply to monopolies delegate by the State to others). 
 292.  TFEU art. 37. (Article 37 (ex 31, 37) of the TFEU reads:  
1. Member States shall adjust any State monopolies of a commercial character 
so as to ensure that no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods 
are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member States.  The 
provisions of this Article shall apply to any body through which a Member State, 
in law or in fact, either directly or indirectly supervises, determines or appreciably 
influences imports or exports between Member States.  These provisions shall 
likewise apply to monopolies delegated by the State to others.  2. Member States 
shall refrain from introducing any new measure which is contrary to the principles 
laid down in paragraph 1 or which restricts the scope of the Articles dealing with 
the prohibition of customs duties and quantitative restrictions between Member 
States.  3. If a State monopoly of a commercial character has rules which are 
designed to make it easier to dispose of agricultural products or obtain for them 
the best return, steps should be taken in applying the rules contained in this 
Article to ensure equivalent safeguards for the employment and standard of 
living of the producers concerned). 
 293.  Restamark, EFTA Ct. Rep. 15, ¶ 65. 
 294.  Id. ¶ 74. 
 295.  Case E-7/11, Grund, elli- og hjúkrunarheimili v. Icelandic Medicines Agency 
(Lyfjastofnun), EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, ¶ 68 (Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://www.efta 
court.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/7_11_Judgment_EN.pdf. 
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the pharmaceuticals from another manufacturer.296  However, in order to 
bring pharmaceuticals into Iceland, the Icelandic government required 
proof that such pharmaceuticals fulfilled the requirements of an Icelandic 
marketing authorization which according to the Icelandic government, the 
invoice and SPC failed to meet, meaning that the nursing home should have 
provided a control report as required by Icelandic law.297  According to the 
Icelandic government, an SPC is not the equivalent of a control report.298 
The key question posed to the EFTA Court was whether the Icelandic 
government could deny a parallel importer’s ability to bring into Iceland 
pharmaceuticals that have marketing authorizations from a fellow 
member-state (here, Norway), on grounds that the Norwegian marketing 
authorization does not meet the requirements of the Icelandic marketing 
authorization for pharmaceuticals having the same name.299  Second, the 
EFTA Court had to determine how a parallel importer without access to 
the original manufacturing control report could satisfy the concerns of the 
Icelandic government if the first part of the question is answered 
affirmatively.300 
The provision for a marketing authorization is embedded in EU 
Directive 2001/83/EU, which mandates that no pharmaceutical product 
can be placed in the marketplace of an EEA member-state unless it has 
secured a marketing authorization that is designed to indicate that the 
benefits of using the pharmaceutical outweigh the associated risks.301 
The EFTA Court was primarily concerned with the fact that the 
member-state requiring a unique marketing authorization for a pharmaceutical 
subject to a parallel import, when the pharmaceuticals have the same 
name, is likely to have all of the necessary information associated with 
the pharmaceutical, thereby making concern for the health and safety of 
its citizens unnecessary.302  Requiring that a parallel import submit a 
manufacturing control report, which was not in the possession of the 
parallel importer and was likely submitted previously by the domestic 
seller of the same pharmaceutical, constituted an unnecessary measure 
having the effective equivalent to a quantitative restriction under Article 
 
 296.  Id. ¶ 14.  In such a case, the nursing home is the parallel importer since the 
pharmaceuticals in question were already available in Iceland with Icelandic authorization.  The 
wholesaler is merely an exporter. 
 297.  Id. ¶ 15. 
 298.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 299.  Id. ¶ 22. 
 300.  Id. ¶ 23. 
 301.  Id. ¶ 51. 
 302.  Id. ¶ 58. 
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11 and not subject to a derogation under Article 13 since clearly less-
restrictive measures are possible.303 
The EFTA Court did prescribe solutions to member-states such as 
Iceland.  According to the EFTA Court, member-states can engage in less 
restrictive maneuvers such as requiring manufacturers to provide control 
reports to the public, using existing information held by the member-state 
and other member-states, instituting a rebuttable presumption of conformity 
between the pharmaceutical already available in the member-state and 
that which is subject to a parallel import, and allowing the parallel importer 
to provide other information in an effort to prove conformity between the 
domestically available pharmaceutical and its parallel import counterpart.304 
The EFTA Court further discussed the merits of parallel importing in 
that such importers work in the pharmaceutical sector in a way that allows 
the price of pharmaceuticals to drop to the benefit of both patients and 
national health care systems.305  Moreover, the presence of parallel importers 
avoids “unnecessary partitioning” of the EEA marketplace by member-
state and avoids monopolies.306 
VI.  ANALYSIS OF THE ECJ’S JURISPRUDENCE ON ARTICLE 34 
There are seven prevailing themes found in the ECJ’s jurisprudence.  
First, according to the ECJ, any possible restriction posed by a member-
state must be proportionate to the member-state’s goal.307  In Re Disposable 
Beer Cans, the ECJ stated that there must be a proportional balance struck 
between a member-state’s concern for the environment and a restriction 
on the free movement of goods pursuant to Article 34.308  However, the 
ECJ found the requirement that any imported beer be placed in reusable cans 
to be an unlawful quantitative restriction while stating that there would 
exist other, less restrictive measures that could be employed to meet the 
member-state’s concern for its environment.309  Likewise, in a case that 
most would agree incorporates a more serious set of facts than beer cans, 
the ECJ held in Humanplasma that member-states must allow those 
 
 303.  Id. ¶¶ 62–63, 66. 
 304.  Id. ¶ 67. 
 305.  Id. ¶ 64. 
 306.  Id. ¶ 65. 
 307.  Comm’n v. Den. (Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607, ¶ 13. 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. ¶ 21–22. 
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importing human blood to show proof that the blood is untainted and safe 
instead of a blanket rule that prohibits the import of human blood without 
proof that the donor was unpaid for the donated blood.310 The ECJ found 
Austria’s ban unpalatable given its proportionality test and further 
provided methods member-states could employ to make sure donated blood 
passing national boundaries is safe.311 
A second and related theme in the Disposable Beer Cans and 
Humanplasma cases is the strong preference by the ECJ to force member-
states to allow private parties to prove that they can meet the concerns of 
the member-states.  In Disposable Beer Cans, the ECJ suggested that 
Denmark allow importers to prove that the beer cans they use could be 
reusable instead of being forced to purchase a particular type of beer 
can.312  In Humanplasma, the ECJ suggested that Austria could require 
that blood be tested before importation.313  Thus, any member-state considering 
a restriction on the free movement of goods in the form of a quantitative 
restriction should anticipate that, if the restriction is challenged, the ECJ will 
force the member-state to prove that a private party itself cannot show 
means to meet the goal of the member-state that supports the restriction. 
A third major theme depicted in this survey of cases is that member-
states must be uniform in their health concerns when defending a regulation 
that amounts to a quantitative restriction.  In Criminal Proceedings Against 
Zoni, the ECJ found intolerable, in the face of Article 34, an Italian law 
that prohibited the importation of pasta made of either common wheat or 
a mix of durum wheat and common wheat, partially on grounds that Italy 
had supplied no evidence that the imported pasta would contain any 
harmful additives or colors.314  Similarly, the ECJ stated in Commission 
v. Denmark that its ban on foodstuffs containing added vitamins and 
minerals was a violation of Article 34 largely due to Denmark’s inability 
to provide scientific proof that the ban was necessary to protect human 
health.315  The ECJ provided a related result in Humanplasma stating that 
since other member-states allow for blood donors to be compensated and 
EU law requires testing of such blood donations, the Austrian government 
could not enforce its ban on imported blood coming from member-states that 
allowed for donor compensation.316  Likewise, Germany could not enforce 
its ban on imported meat products that included non-meat elements against 
 
 310.  Humanplasma GmbH, 2010 E.C.R. I-2389, ¶¶ 42, 46. 
 311.  Id. ¶¶ 43–45. 
 312.  Comm’n v. Den. (Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607, ¶ 19. 
 313.  Humanplasma GmbH, 2010 E.C.R. I-2389, ¶¶ 43–45. 
 314.  Case C-90/89, Criminal Proceedings Against Zoni, 1988 E.C.R. 4285, ¶¶ 13, 
20, 28. 
 315.  Comm’n v. Den., 2003 E.C.R. I-9724, ¶¶ 48, 55, 57. 
 316.  Humanplasma GmbH, 2010 E.C.R. I-2389, ¶¶ 43–46. 
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Article 34 since, although Germany attempted to justify the ban on grave 
concerns for health, the ECJ found that Germany’s own research purported 
that Germans were receiving sufficient amounts of protein in their diets.317  
In a second case from Germany, Re Purity Requirements for Beer, the ECJ 
found fault with Germany’s ban on imported beer products not meeting its 
requirements, in part due to the fact that Germany prohibited certain 
additives in beer yet allowed many of those additives to remain in its soft 
drinks.318 
The fourth major theme is the almost uniform faith the ECJ possesses 
for warning labels as a means to allay fears among member-states that 
consumers will not be protected from imported products in which they are 
not familiar.  In Criminal Proceedings Against Zoni, despite fears on the 
part of the Italian government that Italians would not be able to check the 
accuracy of labeling, the ECJ endorsed the potential labeling requirement 
as a means to meet Italy’s consumer protection concerns so that consumers 
would know the contents of their purchased pasta.319  In a similar fashion, 
the ECJ contended that labeling requirements in lieu of an absolute ban 
would suffice to protect consumers from purchasing the wrong kind of 
alcoholic beverage despite the similarity in bottle design in Re the Use of 
Champagne-Type Bottles.320  The result was the same in Re Purity 
Requirements for Beer, in which the ECJ stated that labeling requirements 
could allow purchasers of beer to know the beverage’s contents. 321  
Ironically, the ECJ rejected a Belgian requirement that Scotch whisky 
imported into that member-state be accompanied by a certificate of 
authenticity, which seemingly would serve the same function as a warning 
label.322 
The fifth major theme exhibited by these cases is the trust that the ECJ 
has in consumers to make their own choices and choose their own risks.  
The fourth major theme, the faith in warning labels, alone reflects an ECJ 
belief that consumers will read those espoused warning labels.  However, 
the ECJ has gone further.  In Criminal Proceedings Against Zoni, the ECJ 
 
 317.  Comm’n v. Ger., 1989 E.C.R. 229, ¶¶ 2, 6, 8, 23. 
 318.  Comm’n v. Ger. (Re Purity Requirements for Beer), 1987 E.C.R. 1227, ¶ 38. 
 319.  Zoni, 1988 E.C.R. 4285, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 16, 17, 20. 
 320.  Case C-179/85, Comm’n v. Ger. (Re Use of Champagne-Type Bottles), 1986 
E.C.R. 3879, ¶¶ 13–15. 
 321.  Comm’n v. Ger. (Re Purity Requirements for Beer), 1987 E.C.R. 1227, ¶ 33–
35. 
 322.  Case C-8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, ¶ 4.  The ECJ’s 
focus was more so on cost to the importer rather than consumer protection.  Id. ¶¶ 4, 6. 
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specifically endorsed consumer preference by stating that it was desirable 
to have many kinds of pasta available for purchase and consumers should 
be able to use their purchasing power to choose a pasta.323  Likewise, in 
Commission v. Germany, the ECJ contended that consumers should be 
allowed to maintain choices as to the nutritional value of meat products 
available for purchase.324 
There are three cases surveyed in this work that exemplify the sixth 
major theme, which is the ECJ’s insistence on equal treatment.  In Conegate 
v. HM Customs, the ECJ found a British ban on imported sex dolls 
incompatible with Article 34 since the various political units in the United 
Kingdom had different standards and the import ban itself was more 
restrictive than any of those standards.325  The ECJ commented similarly 
in Ahokainen and Leppik, stating that Finland’s requirement that alcohol 
importers must maintain a license to do so violates Article 34 when the 
goods being imported (alcohol) are legal, made, and marketed in Finland and 
elsewhere.326 
The last major theme revealed in the case law is the lack of support the 
ECJ maintains for member-state regulations that may increase costs to the 
importer.  In Dassonville, the ECJ immediately picked up on Belgium’s 
requirement that imported Scotch whisky be accompanied by a certificate 
of authenticity, which would increase the cost to the importer and make 
the importer’s product more expensive.327 The ECJ was equally concerned 
with additional costs that could be extended to the importer in Re Disposable 
Beer Cans in that the mandatory use of the government-required beer cans 
could be an additional expense for the importer and possibly pricing the 
importer out of the Danish market.328 
However, there are two cases that do not fit the ECJ’s strict prohibition 
on quantitative restrictions in the face of Article 34—Lucien Ortscheit and 
Hahn.  The facts of Lucien Ortscheit make it the most troublesome in light 
of the dominant disposition of ECJ jurisprudence: the ECJ allowed 
Germany to engage in an advertising ban of pharmaceuticals being imported 
into Germany, but did not ban the pharmaceuticals themselves despite the 
fact that the pharmaceuticals were available in other member-states.329  
Although it is difficult to rationalize the ECJ’s decision in Lucien Ortscheit, 
it likely rests with the fact that the ECJ itself stated that EU law was not 
 
 323.  Zoni, 1988 E.C.R. 4285, ¶ 27. 
 324.  Comm’n v. Ger., 1989 E.C.R. 229, ¶10. 
 325.  Conegate Ltd., 1986 E.C.R. 1007, ¶¶ 8–10, 12. 
 326.  Ahokainen, 2006 E.C.R. I-9171, ¶¶ 35, 39. 
 327.  Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, ¶ 4. 
 328.  Comm’n v. Den. (Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607, 4631–32. 
 329.  Lucien Ortscheit GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. I-5243, ¶¶ 12, 20–21. 
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harmonized on this topic.330  However, the facts of Hahn seem less than 
compelling.  Here, the ECJ allowed Austria to impose health-screening 
standards above what EU law already required.331  In other words, and 
perhaps making the decision in Lucien Ortscheit more difficult to rationalize, 
EU law had clearly been harmonized in the form of both a directive and a 
decision on fish contamination.332 
The lack of jurisprudential fit is perhaps strongest in Ministere Public 
v. Mirepoix.  In that case, the ECJ allowed France’s ban on imported 
agricultural products that were sprayed with a banned pesticide.333  It could 
certainly be argued that of all the cases surveyed in this work from the 
ECJ, this case has the best set of pro-member-state regulation facts in that 
the quantitative restriction was based on a dangerous and banned pesticide, 
but the facts do not seem as compelling as those in Humanplasma, where the 
Austrian ban was based on a concern that contaminated blood might flow 
across member-state boundaries.  Regardless, the facts of Humanplasma 
seem more compelling than a concern for tainted fish crossing international 
lines, as was the case in Hahn.  Most likely, the ECJ’s decision in Hahn can 
be justified on grounds that the ECJ found international scientific research 
finding adverse health effects associated with the chemical by which the 
Austrian government had attached a zero tolerance level.334 
VII.  SEPARATIONS AND SIMILARITIES IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
ECJ AND EFTA COURT AND ANALYSIS 
The first separation in jurisprudence between the ECJ and the EFTA 
Court can be found by examining Ullensaker Kommune v. Nille.  In 
Ullensaker, the EFTA Court upheld a Norwegian regulation against an 
Article 11 attack requiring sellers of videos to maintain a license that 
would be granted by Norwegian municipalities.335  The focus on the EFTA 
Court’s decision was not on the ability of videos to make their way into 
 
 330.  Id. ¶ 18. 
 331.  Case C-121/00, Austria v. Hahn (Criminal Proceedings Against Walter Hahn) 
2002 E.C.R. I-9193, ¶¶ 45–47. 
 332.  Id. 
 333.  Case C-54/85, Ministere Public v. Xavier Mirepoix, 1996 E.C.R. I-1067, ¶¶ 14, 
16. 
 334.  Hahn, 2002 E.C.R. I-9193, ¶¶ 34, 36, 39–41. 
 335.  Ullensaker Kommune v. Nille AS, Case E-5/96, EFTA Ct. Rep. 30, ¶ 23 (May 
14, 1997), available at http://eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/5_96_Advisory_Opinion 
_EN.pdf. 
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Norway, but instead the potential impact for unequal treatment once the 
videos made their way inside Norway despite the fact that most videos 
sold in Norway come into the country as imports.336  Although the EFTA 
Court relied on the ECJ’s decision in Criminal Proceedings Against Keck 
to reach a conclusion that the licensing regime should be upheld, the 
EFTA Court’s ruling seems to part ways with the ECJ’s decision in  
Ahokainen and Leppik.  In the latter case, the ECJ found disfavor in light 
of Article 34 with Finland’s requirement that alcohol importers have a 
license to do so.337  The ECJ’s decision reflected a greater concern that the 
importer would suffer increased costs associated with its product in 
comparison to the EFTA Court’s lack of concern that the Norwegian video 
sales license requirement would raise prices associated with imported 
videos.338  What is also very noticeable when comparing the two licensing 
cases is that the ECJ maintained its proportionality requirement while 
the EFTA Court took a more deferential approach and stated that a national 
court could better measure balance between Article 11 and Article 13.339 
As stated above, the ECJ has been continuously concerned with the 
extra costs that an importer may suffer because of a member-state’s 
regulation on goods coming in from another member-state.  Here lies the 
second instance of separation between the ECJ and the EFTA Court.  In 
HOB-vin v. Iceland, the EFTA Court upheld Iceland’s requirement that 
all imported alcohol come into the country on a government-authorized 
pallet.340  Despite the plaintiff’s chief arguments that the authorized pallet 
requirement would force additional costs to be assessed against its alcohol 
product, the EFTA Court found that Article 11’s prohibition against 
quantitative restrictions on imports did not apply to regulations applicable 
to the procurement and marketing of products.341 
The EFTA Court’s approach is quite different than the theory espoused 
by the ECJ in the Dassonville, Ahokainen and Leppik, and Re Disposable 
Beer Cans cases.  In these three cases, the ECJ found that the requirement 
of a certificate of authenticity, the mandate that importers of alcohol have 
an import license, and perhaps more to the point, the requirement that 
importers of beer used government-approved reusable cans to be an 
 
 336.  Id. ¶ 20. 
 337.  Ahokainen, 2006 E.C.R. I-9171, ¶¶ 22, 39. 
 338.  Id. ¶ 35. 
 339.  Ahokainen, 2006 E.C.R. I-9171, ¶¶ 29, 31; Ullensaker, EFTA Ct. Rep. 30, ¶¶ 
33, 37. 
 340.  HOB-vín v. Ice., Case E-4/05, EFTA Ct. Rep. 4, ¶ 38. 
 341.  Id. ¶¶ 27–38. 
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infringement of Article 34 based at least in part on the idea that importers 
would suffer increased costs.342 
The decision in Wilhelmsen v. Oslo kommune is a reflection of the third 
ideological split between the EFTA Court and the ECJ.  In Wilhelmsen, 
the EFTA Court supported Norway’s requirement that a state-granted 
monopoly maintain control over imported beer possessing an alcohol 
content above a certain level.343  However, more importantly, the EFTA 
Court upheld this level of member-state control based on public health 
grounds (preventing alcohol abuse) thus allowing for a quantitative 
restriction based on both Article 11 and Article 13 grounds.344  The approach 
by the ECJ in Re Purity Requirements for Beer was quite different because 
it expressly rejected Germany’s concern that its beer purity laws be upheld 
in the face of Articles 34 and 36 on public health grounds and instead 
decided to allow consumers to make their own choices pursuant to labeling 
requirements.345  Similar comment could be made in regard to the ECJ’s 
holding in Rewe-Zentral.  Here, the ECJ found Germany’s minimum alcohol 
content requirements for imported beer, that were based in part on Germany’s 
concern that lower-level alcoholic products could create greater health 
risks, to violate Article 34 as a quantitative restriction.346 
The ECJ’s decision in Ahokainen and Leppik decision is much closer to 
the EFTA Court’s decision in Wilhelmsen because the ECJ was willing to 
defer to a national court at least to a degree in regard to a regulation that 
limited the consumption of alcohol.347  Regardless, the ECJ still found the 
Finnish restriction to violate Articles 34 and 36 on grounds that such a 
restriction is likely to increase costs to the importer and there are other, 
less restrictive means to achieve the public health goal of limiting access 
to alcohol instead of a mandatory licensing system.348 
Although there are some jurisprudential disconnections between the 
ECJ and the EFTA Court, there are some strong jurisprudential likenesses.  
 
 342.  Case C-8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 854; Ahokainen, 
2006 E.C.R. I-9171, ¶ 35; Comm’n v. Den. (Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607. 
 343.  Wilhelmsen, EFTA Ct. Rep. 53, ¶111. 
 344.  Id. ¶¶ 55, 87, 111. 
 345.  Case C-178/84, Comm’n v. Den. (Re Purity Requirements for Beer), 1987 
E.C.R. I-1227, 1 C.M.L.R. 780, 801–03, 807–08, 811 (1988). 
 346.  Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 
1979 E.C.R. 649, 3 C.M.L.R. 494, 510 (1979). 
 347.  Wilhelmsen, EFTA Ct. Rep. 53, ¶ 57; Ahokainen, 2006 E.C.R I-9171, ¶¶ 39–
40. 
 348.  Ahokainen, 2006 E.C.R I-9171, ¶¶ 29, 31, 35. 
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The first can be found in the EFTA Court’s decision in EFTA Surveillance 
Authority v. Norway, where it found Norway’s ban on the importation of 
cornflakes (due to the fact they were fortified with several vitamins and 
minerals) to be a violation of Article 11 above the member-state’s 
concerns that the Norwegian population did not need such additives.349  In 
three cases—Commission v. Denmark (enriched foodstuffs), Criminal 
Proceedings Against Zoni (common wheat and durum wheat), and Commission 
v. Germany (meat products with non-meat elements), the ECJ found 
prohibitions on the importation of foodstuffs based on nutritional or 
consumer protection concerns to be violations of Article 34.350  In Criminal 
Proceedings Against Zoni and Commission v. Germany, the ECJ once again 
found greater faith in consumers to make the correct choice based on the 
content of a warning label.351  However, in Commission v. Denmark, the ECJ 
was much more heavy-handed and demanded that a member-state prohibiting 
imported foodstuffs based on content grounds must have scientific research 
to support such a ban.352 
A second connection in jurisprudence can be found in the Ahokainen 
and Leppik and Restamark cases.  The EFTA Court in Restamark found 
that a Finnish regulation that required permission from a state monopoly 
to import alcohol was an unjustified quantitative restriction under Article 
11 and Article 13.353  The EFTA Court’s language in Restamark was much 
stronger because it required a finding of proportionality to justify a restriction 
on Article 13 grounds allowing for public health regulations.354  The EFTA 
Court also did not believe a system in which control of alcohol was vested 
in a state-granted monopoly was the best means to achieve Finland’s goal 
of reducing alcohol consumption.355  Ahokainen and Leppik is another 
case originating in Finland in which the ECJ likewise found the Finnish 
requirement of a license from a state-granted monopoly inexcusable under 
Articles 34 and 36.356  Similar to the EFTA Court in Restamark, the ECJ 
required a finding of proportionality between the regulation and the 
member-state goal, which, according to the ECJ, did not exist.357 
The decision by the EFTA Court in Fagtun ehf v. Byggingarnefnd 
Borgarholtsskóla reflects jurisprudence closer to that of traditional ECJ 
 
 349.  EFTA Surveillance Authority, EFTA Ct. Rep. 73, ¶ 43. 
 350.  Comm’n v. Den., 2003 E.C.R. I-9724, ¶ 57; Zoni, 1988 E.C.R 4285, ¶¶ 12, 20, 
28; Comm’n v. Ger., 1989 E.C.R 229, ¶¶ 2, 7, 10, 23. 
 351.  Zoni, 1988 E.C.R 4285, ¶¶ 14, 16; Comm’n v. Ger., 1989 E.C.R 229, ¶ 13. 
 352.  Comm’n v. Den., 2003 E.C.R. I-9724, ¶¶ 46–48. 
 353.  Restamark, EFTA Ct. Rep. 15, ¶¶ 50, 61. 
 354.  Id. ¶¶ 57–59. 
 355.  Id. ¶ 60. 
 356.  Ahokainen, 2006 E.C.R I-9171, ¶¶ 22, 30. 
 357.  Id. ¶¶ 29, 31. 
TUDORADA (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  1:50 PM 
[VOL. 17:  75, 2015]  Comparison of ECJ and EFTA Courts 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 121 
decisions and represents a third example of agreement between the two 
European courts.  In Fagtun ehf, the EFTA Court stated that Iceland’s 
requirement that all building materials to be used on school buildings be 
manufactured in Iceland violated Article 11.358  Of important note in Fagtun 
ehf was the EFTA Court’s comment that no proof existed that the imported 
school building materials could not have met the standards set by the 
Icelandic government and that the regulation was a blatant form of 
discrimination favoring national production of such materials as no imported 
materials could possibly be manufactured under the supervision of 
the Icelandic government.359  Furthermore, the EFTA Court stated that 
Iceland should maintain the burden of proof to show that other imported 
materials could not meet the standards set by Iceland.360 
Two cases from the ECJ identified in this work are similar to the Fagtun 
ehf decision by the EFTA Court.  The ECJ’s decision in Re Disposable 
Beer Cans similarly required the Danish government to relinquish its 
requirement that beer importers use preapproved beer cans in contrast to 
a more preferable system whereby the beer importer could show that its 
beer cans could pass muster against Danish public health standards.361  As 
well, the ECJ in Humanplasma made several suggestions serving as 
alternatives to the Austrian government as to how it could protect its citizens 
against the risks associated with tainted, imported blood while recognizing a 
heightened level of authority for member-states to set restrictions based 
on public health grounds.362 
Perhaps the most unusual jurisprudential connection between the EFTA 
Court and the ECJ can be found while examining the former’s decision in 
Phillip Morris and the latter’s decision in Lucien Ortscheit.  The link 
between these cases is unusual due to the fact that both courts found tolerable 
a restriction affecting imports.  In Phillip Morris, the EFTA Court upheld 
in the face of an Article 11 challenge an all-encompassing ban on tobacco 
advertising which included both domestic and imported brands despite the 
fact that the domestic tobacco brands would have an advantage over the 
imported rivals since Norwegian consumers would naturally be more 
 
 358.  Fagtun ehf., EFTA Ct. Rep. 51, ¶¶ 30–32 
 359.  Id. ¶¶ 25, 30, 32. 
 360.  Id. ¶¶ 37, 38. 
 361.  Comm’n v. Den.,(Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607. 
 362.  Humanplasma GmbH, 2010 E.C.R I-2389, ¶¶ 39–40, 43–45. 
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familiar with the brands formerly produced in Norway.363  The EFTA Court 
found the Norwegian advertising ban to be more of a regulation on selling 
arrangements.364 In Lucien Ortscheit, the ECJ upheld (in the face of Articles 
34 and 36) an advertising ban on pharmaceuticals imported into Germany 
while still allowing for the importation of these pharmaceuticals.365  In 
contrast to the EFTA Court, the ECJ found the German ban tolerable under 
Article 36 as a limitation on imports to protect human health.366 
VIII.   CONCLUSION AND THE THREAT TO EEA HARMONY 
Some scholars have commented that the international legal system is 
becoming fractured in its jurisprudence.367  Admittedly, this work only 
explores a few cases that highlight some of the differences in jurisprudence 
between the ECJ and the EFTA Court on the subject of the free movement 
of goods in an attempt to gauge the level of, and momentum for, the 
harmonization of law only in Europe and only on the topic of free movement 
of goods.  However, it should be noted that these are not the only prominent 
European courts charged either expressly or impliedly with the harmonization 
of law in Europe.  Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann argues that the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights should be part of 
any calculus to gauge the level of harmonization of law in Europe, especially 
on the topics of economic rights and taxation on which both the TFEU 
and EEA comment.368  Regardless of the reason for the jurisprudential 
difference, the difference presents several risks to the legal efforts toward 
harmony in the EEA common market. 
The first risk is that the EEA will evolve into a “two-speed” trade 
association whereby the EU countries will be harnessed by tighter restrictions 
on any attempt to enact rules that will limit the cross-border trade of goods 
in comparison to the countries of Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland.  
Over time, the uncertainty over the interpretation of common market law 
could cause trade distortions as some traders will be more comfortable 
trading within the EU and thus, in order to reduce the risk of being blocked 
 
 363.  Philip Morris Norway AS v. The Norwegian State, Case E-16/10, EFTA Ct. 
Rep. 330, ¶¶ 16, 35–37, 51, 86, 88 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/ 
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 367.  Ioana Cismas, The Integration of Human Rights in Bilateral and Plurilateral 
Free Trade Agreements: Arguments for a Coherent Relationship with Reference to the 
Swiss Context, 21 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 3, 5 (2013). 
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by a domestic regulation, those same traders will concentrate on the markets 
of the 28 EU member-states to the detriment of the remaining EEA 
member-states.  As stated above, it was a chief concern among firms 
located in countries outside the EU/EEC during the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s that forged a stronger relationship between the EU and the EFTA 
countries resulting in the EEA.  A return to a two-speed Europe would expose 
firms outside the EU, but within the EEA, to risks that they become 
relatively less competitive in comparison to the firms within the EU. 
This two-speed Europe would also expose the citizens of the three 
EFTA countries to a reduction in the level of competition among firms 
producing goods.  If the EFTA Court continues to find ways to allow 
member-states in the EEA, but not in the EU, to enact restrictions even in 
the face of an Article 11 attack, those citizens will face higher prices and 
potentially poorer quality.  Thankfully, the EFTA Court found some limits 
on the ability of a member-state to enact restrictions in EFTA Surveillance 
Authority and Fagtun.  Regardless, the Ullensaker, HOB-vin, and Wilhelmsen 
cases are still good law. 
A second risk is that with continuing differences in common market law 
interpretation, the EEA dissolves.  It is foreseeable that if the disparity in 
jurisprudence continues, at some point in time the EU government will 
take action to push the EFTA Court, and the EFTA member-states, to 
adopt a stricter interpretation of common market law.  In turn, if the EFTA 
countries do not find this palatable, these three member-states may exit 
the alliance.  The potential for a split is not motivated by jurisprudential 
differences alone.  As mentioned above, Iceland is no longer seeking entry 
into the EU.  At the time of this writing, the United Kingdom, a current EU 
member and former EFTA member, is contemplating a referendum on 
maintaining member-state status.369 
A third risk is the worst imaginable.  Given the current momentum 
toward protectionist measures being adopted by all countries (albeit 
largely due to political winds that have been produced by poor economic 
conditions), many of the EU countries could become more comfortable 
with the EFTA Court’s jurisprudence and push the ECJ, and the  EU 
government in general, to adopt the EFTA Court’s jurisprudence.  Although 
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it would most certainly be viewed as shortsighted and politically motivated, 
but if domestic politicians see a gain by pushing for greater restrictions on 
imports, the EU’s common market itself could be in jeopardy. 
One explanation for the jurisprudential differences between the EFTA 
Court and the ECJ, aside from the cultural differences discussed throughout 
this work, could rest on reality that the EFTA Court’s jurisdiction is more 
limited in comparison to the ECJ’s jurisdiction, despite the fact that both 
courts are charged with interpreting the EEA uniformly.370  Currently, the 
EFTA trade group is in negotiations with several other countries in various 
areas of the world including other non-EU, non-EEA countries, Central 
Asian countries, and even East Asian countries.371  However, there is 
comment that trade negotiations on the part of EFTA have focused more 
on general guidelines instead of specific rules which leads one to believe 
that the trade group is still not ready for more integrative economic 
relations.372  It will be very interesting to see if the EFTA changes its trade 
focus towards greater integration over time reflective of a common market 
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